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RULE 3.8, THE JENCKS ACT, AND HOW THE
ABA CREATED A CONFLICT BETWEEN
ETHICS AND THE LAW ON
PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
KIRSTEN M. SCHIMPFF*
A prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense has proved
to be one of the thorniest issues in criminal practice, no doubt in large part due
to the complex, overlapping, and, at times, conflicting web of rules and
standards governing that obligation: constitutional doctrine, statutory law,
criminal procedure rules, and state ethics rules. The Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association
recently issued an expansive interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which governs prosecutorial disclosure.
As
interpreted in Formal Opinion 09-454, Rule 3.8(d) is now in direct conflict
with a federal statute governing disclosure of witness statements.
This Article critiques the process by which this conflict was created. In
essence, the ABA adopted positions that proponents of broader and earlier
disclosure had sought—unsuccessfully—to attain through litigation,
legislation, or rulemaking processes. These earlier reform efforts failed largely
due to the need to avoid the very conflict with the Jencks Act that the Opinion
has now created. The Article examines the implications of this conflict, and
charts a path forward. Specifically, the Article argues that reforming federal
criminal discovery practice requires going through—not around—one or more
of the three institutions legitimately capable of harmonizing the rules regarding
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, Seattle University School of
Law. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B. Duke University. I was an Assistant United
States Attorney in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Seattle,
Washington, from 2002 to 2005. Although I was not a prosecutor, I had the privilege
of working with the many dedicated, fair-minded prosecutors in that Office. In any
event, all of the opinions expressed in this Article are my own. Thanks go to Barbara
Swatt Engstrom and Ryan Warbis for their excellent research assistance, and to the
many colleagues at Seattle University School of Law who offered valuable suggestions
and encouragement along the way.
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disclosure: The Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress, or the
United States Supreme Court.
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INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have long been at odds over the
scope and timing of a prosecutor’s obligation to turn over
information favorable to the defendant in a criminal matter. A spate
of high profile cases has pushed the issue into the public eye
recently,1 but the battle over disclosure has been waged for decades.
1. For example, the W.R. Grace asbestos prosecution, the public corruption
trial of the late Senator Ted Stevens, and the Duke lacrosse team rape case—in each
of which prosecutors were excoriated for failing to timely disclose exculpatory
information to the defense—all received significant media attention. See generally
Kirk Johnson, Prosecution in Asbestos Poisoning of Montana Town Is Forced To Go on
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at A9; Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in
Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1; Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment
for Prosecutor in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, at A21.
The consequences in such cases can be far-reaching, not only for the defendants,
but also for the prosecutors involved. In the Duke case, several college studentathletes were subjected to national media scrutiny, their reputations were tarnished,
and their educations were interrupted, based on what turned out to be
unsubstantiated allegations that they sexually assaulted an exotic dancer. See, e.g.,
Duff Wilson & David Barstow, Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against Lacrosse Players,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A1. The prosecutor in the Duke case was eventually
disbarred after it came to light that he failed to disclose evidence that cast serious
doubt on the allegations in the first place. See Wilson, supra at A21. In the Ted
Stevens case, Senator Stevens’s conviction on public corruption charges was set aside,
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Ever since the landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland,2 proponents
of broader, and earlier, disclosure have fought on several fronts to
move the law in that direction. Most of these efforts have been
resisted at the federal level by the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ). Proponents of greater disclosure have had the
greatest success in the arena of state ethics laws, which now apply to
both state and federal prosecutors.3 Specifically, nearly every state
has adopted a version of Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,4 which imposes broader disclosure obligations
on prosecutors than what is constitutionally required. Adoption of
Rule 3.8(d) has not put the matter to rest, however; efforts to expand
prosecutors’ disclosure obligations have continued.
The latest development in this ongoing battle over disclosure
obligations is Formal Opinion 09-454 (“the Opinion”), issued by the
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association (ABA) (“ABA Ethics Committee”) in July
2009, which interprets Rule 3.8(d).5 The Opinion follows on the
heels of recent unsuccessful efforts waged by the defense bar to
change Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure6 and
other rules and laws governing disclosure.
The Opinion is
substantially pro-defense, and adopts many of the positions
championed by proponents of these failed reform efforts, in ways that
are contrary to the prevailing law.
Specifically, Formal Opinion 09-454 states that a prosecutor must
disclose all known information favorable to the defendant, even if it is
only minimally relevant or believed to be highly unreliable.7 Under
Rule 16 and the prevailing case law, only material information must be
disclosed.8 The Opinion also declares that disclosure must be made
“as soon as reasonably practical” once the information is known to
and all charges were dismissed by the Justice Department, after it was revealed that
federal prosecutors had withheld notes from an interview with a key government
witness. In the meantime, however, Senator Stevens lost his bid for reelection
approximately one month after his conviction. Charlie Savage, Prosecutor Who Pursued
Stevens Case Kills Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, at A19. During the course of the
investigations into the prosecutors’ handling of the case, one of the prosecutors
involved committed suicide. See id.
2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006) (subjecting federal prosecutors to the same
laws and rules as all other attorneys).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
5. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
7. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 4–5
(“Nothing in the rule suggests a de minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure
duty . . . .”).
8. See infra Part I.B.
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the prosecutor;9 however, the prevailing legal standard is that
disclosure is timely so long as it is made with enough time for the
defense to use it at trial.10 Furthermore, according to the Opinion, a
prosecutor must make the necessary disclosures prior to the
defendant entering a guilty plea, and the defendant may not waive
her right to the information as part of a plea deal.11 Both of these
positions have been explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme
Court, at least with respect to information used for impeachment
purposes.12
Although all of these positions are certain to generate controversy
and discussion, this Article focuses in particular on one aspect of
Formal Opinion 09-454: its interpretation of the timing requirement.
This topic is especially important because the Opinion’s
interpretation of the timing requirement is so expansive that it
creates a direct conflict between the ethics rule governing
prosecutorial disclosure and a relevant federal statute.
Specifically, as discussed in more detail below, the Jencks Act13
governs the disclosure of witness statements in federal criminal trials,
and provides that the government is not required to disclose witness
statements until after the witness has testified on direct examination
at trial. In many jurisdictions, courts have held that the Jencks Act
means that prosecutors cannot be required to disclose witness
statements sooner than the statute requires, even when the
statements contain the sort of “favorable” information the ethics rule
(and other sources of law) require to be disclosed in a “timely”
manner. A conflict between the ethics rule and the statute could be
avoided by interpreting “timely” to mean at a time consistent with
what the law provides. Instead, the ABA Ethics Committee chose to
9. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6.
10. See infra Part I.A (noting that the prevailing standard results in contextspecific disparities in the timing of disclosures).
11. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 7
(opining that “[a] defendant’s consent does not absolve a prosecutor of the duty
imposed by Rule 3.8(d), and therefore a prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely on
the defendant’s consent”).
12. See infra Part II.A. The Opinion also adds an ethical obligation on
supervisory attorneys to ensure compliance by trial prosecutors. See ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 8. In at least one respect,
however, the Opinion is less pro-defense than the prevailing law. See id. at 5–6.
According to the Opinion, compliance with Rule 3.8(d) does not require a
prosecutor to conduct searches or investigations for favorable information that may
possibly exist but of which the prosecutor is unaware, see id. at 5–6, whereas as a
matter of constitutional law, a prosecutor must actively search out the evidence in the
case files and in the files of related agencies reasonably expected to have possession
of such information. Infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (2006)).
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interpret “timely” to mean as soon as reasonably practical once the
information becomes known, essentially, right away. An obligation to
disclose immediately conflicts with the statutory standard of
disclosing after the witness has testified at trial.
Much has been written about prosecutorial ethics and the duties of
disclosure,14 and this Article does not attempt to wade into the debate
over the appropriate scope of disclosure. The subject of who should
regulate the conduct of federal prosecutors has also received a lot of
attention from scholars.15 Whether federal prosecutors could be
required to follow state ethics laws in the first place was highly
controversial,16 although this question has, for all practical purposes,
been resolved in the affirmative by the passage of the Citizens
Protection Act17 (popularly known as the “McDade Amendment”).
What remains, however, is the potential for conflict between these
ethical obligations and long-standing federal case and statutory law,
common practices, and law enforcement interests.18
14. See infra note 29 (listing articles that discuss disclosure obligations and
prosecutorial ethics).
15. See generally, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The
Misuse of “Ethical Rules” Against Prosecutors To Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 665 (1996) (contending that a uniform federal code of ethics would be
preferable in many respects to a system where state ethics rules can conflict with
federal criminal law); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal
Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1996) (concluding that while the Attorney
General possesses the power to preempt ethical rules and exempt federal
prosecutors, exercising that power would damage DOJ’s “good will” and raise
significant federalism concerns); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of
Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996) (discussing the “battle” between the ABA and DOJ over
which entity is better suited to govern ethical responsibilities).
16. See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2084–88 (2000) (providing a history of the dispute over
whether state ethics rules apply to federal prosecutors).
17. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-118 (1998) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 530B (2006)); infra notes 83–85.
18. Other areas of conflict previously identified by commentators include those
created by the ethics rules regulating attorney subpoenas (now-repealed version of
Model Rule 3.8(f)), contact with represented persons (Model Rule 4.2 and its
predecessor Model Code DR 7-104), and grand jury practice (Model Rule 3.3(d) in
tandem with now-repealed comment 1 to Model Rule 3.8). See, e.g., Little, supra note
15, at 360–64 (discussing attorney subpoena and contacts issues); David G. Trager,
Do Bar Association Ethics Committees Serve the Public or the Profession?: An Argument for
Process Change, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1129, 1152–59 (2006) (discussing contact with
represented persons issue); Note, supra note 16, at 2083–88 (discussing presentation
of exculpatory information to grand jury, attorney subpoena, and contact with
represented persons issues); see also Bowman, supra note 15 (same). The conflict
discussed in this Article, however, appears to be the starkest yet because in none of
these other instances had Congress enacted a statute specifically addressing the issue.
For example, in the case of the Model Rules that purported to require prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory information to the grand jury, such a requirement similarly
exceeded what was required, see United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1992),
but no federal statute explicitly provided that prosecutors need not do so.
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This Article is the first to focus on the peculiar impact that Formal
Opinion 09-454 has on federal prosecutors, and to undertake an indepth critique of the process by which this conflict between ethics
and federal substantive and procedural law was created. Part I of this
Article outlines the overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, sources
of federal prosecutors’ disclosure obligations. Part II discusses the
history of efforts by proponents of more and earlier disclosure, which
continue today, to expand prosecutorial disclosure obligations. Part
III explores the ethics opinion process, including common criticisms
of bar association ethics opinions, and why several of those criticisms
seem particularly apt as applied to the Opinion. Finally, Part IV of
this Article offers recommendations for resolving the conflict created
by this expansive new interpretation of the ethics rules.
I.

SOURCES OF PROSECUTORS’ DUTIES TO DISCLOSE

Federal prosecutors must abide by a complex web of rules and
standards — constitutional doctrine, statutory law, criminal procedure
rules, internal guidelines, and state ethics rules—all of which have
something to say about the disclosure of exculpatory and
impeachment information. As a matter of federal constitutional law,
prosecutors must turn over exculpatory evidence,19 as well as evidence
that could be used to impeach a prosecution witness,20 but in both
cases, only if such evidence is “material.” 21 A federal statute, the
Jencks Act, requires the government to provide witness statements to
the defense, but not until after the witness has testified on direct
examination.22 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
also contains disclosure obligations,23 as does Rule 26.2, which
Federal
essentially restates the Jencks Act requirements.24
prosecutors also must abide by the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM),
which contains DOJ’s internal standards of conduct, including

19. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution’s
failure to disclose material, exculpatory evidence violated the Due Process Clause).
20. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152–55 (1972) (holding that the failure
to disclose the existence of an agreement between prosecutors and a witness was
unconstitutional).
21. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(defining evidence as being material “only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different”).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)–(b) (2006).
23. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (outlining the procedure for disclosure by defendants
and prosecutors).
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a) (mirroring the Jencks Act’s requirement of
disclosure after direct examination of the witness).
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disclosure guidelines.25 Finally, state ethics rules governing attorney
conduct also specifically address prosecutors’ disclosure obligations.26
A. Constitutional and Statutory Disclosure Obligations
Due process requires that the government disclose to the accused
any favorable evidence in its possession that is material to guilt or
punishment.27 “Favorable” evidence includes not only evidence
tending to exculpate the accused, but also any evidence that adversely
affects the credibility of the government’s witnesses.28 Evidence is
“material” if there is a reasonable probability that it would affect the
outcome of the proceeding.29 To meet the requirements of Brady
and its progeny, a prosecutor must actively search out the evidence in

25. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-5.001(B)(1)
(2010) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm#9-5.001
(adopting
a
disclosure policy more expansive than is constitutionally required).
26. Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
27. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
28. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Impeachment evidence, often referred to as “Giglio evidence”
or “Giglio material,” is governed by the same legal principles that govern the
disclosure of Brady material. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–55. Giglio material is, in essence,
a subset of the universe that comprises Brady material. Id. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that “evidence favorable to an accused,” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87,
consists of both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (“[T]he Court [has] disavowed any difference
between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes.”); Bagley, 473
U.S. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within
the Brady rule.”). Unless otherwise specified, the terms “Brady material” or “Brady
evidence” as used in this Article are meant to encompass both exculpatory evidence
and evidence that may be used to impeach a government witness.
29. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (defining a “‘reasonable
probability’ as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’”
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))). Commentators have
criticized this use of a post-verdict materiality standard to define a prosecutor’s
pretrial disclosure obligation as being both unfair to the defendant and as creating
unnecessary uncertainty for prosecutors. See, e.g., Beth Brennan & Andrew King-Ries,
A Fall from Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and the Need for Criminal Discovery
Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 326 (2010) (noting that because materiality
is measured by confidence in the verdict, it is difficult to define the scope of the
government’s disclosure obligation during trial); see also Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 487–88 (2009) (arguing that even ethical
prosecutors may fail to disclose exculpatory evidence because of limitations of the
Brady doctrine itself —specifically, the anomalous use of a single standard of
materiality to determine both whether a conviction should be reversed if the
prosecutor fails to disclose evidence and whether the prosecutor is required to
disclose the evidence at all); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The
Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (2005) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s decisions on materiality have actually created a disincentive for
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence in close cases). The Supreme Court has
recognized the anomaly as well, although the Court has concluded that it will lead
the “prudent prosecutor” to resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
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the case file and in the files of related agencies reasonably expected
to have possession of such information.30 A prosecutor’s duty to
disclose Brady material attaches whether or not a defendant makes a
specific request for the evidence.31
A prosecutor is not required, however, to disclose the entire
contents of the government’s case file to defense counsel;32 rather, a
prosecutor’s constitutional obligations are satisfied by the disclosure
of evidence that is favorable to the defense, the suppression of which
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.33 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has never pinpointed the time at which Brady disclosures must
be made. Rather, the requirements of due process will be satisfied so
long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant with enough time
for the defense to effectively use it at trial.34 Therefore, what
constitutes a “timely” disclosure of Brady material varies depending
upon the context.35 As a matter of due process, this sometimes— but
not always—requires pretrial disclosure.36
The Jencks Act governs the disclosure of statements made by
government witnesses.37 The Act specifies both the scope38 and, most
30. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
31. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (noting that in the interest of “elementary
fairness,” situations involving evidence of “substantial value” to the defendant
necessitate disclosure, even absent a request).
32. There is no general constitutional right to “discovery” in a criminal case.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
33. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (explaining that disclosure requirements are not
designed to undermine the adversarial nature of the American legal system).
34. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that
it is not feasible or desirable to specify the timing of disclosure except by reference to
the defendant’s opportunity to use it under the circumstances and, therefore, courts
have declined to hold that due process requires more than that Brady material must
be disclosed in time for the defense to use it at trial).
35. See id. (“[T]he time required for the effective use of a particular item of
evidence will depend on the materiality of that evidence . . . as well as the particular
circumstances of the case.”); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 43–44 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that the timing of disclosure “depends on what information has been
requested and how that information will be used by” the defendant); United States v.
Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (“As long as ultimate disclosure is made
before it is too late for the defendants to make use of any benefits of the evidence,
Due Process is satisfied.”).
36. Compare United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(“Disclosure by the government must be made at such a time as to allow the defense
to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its
case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires pretrial disclosure.”), and United
States v. Mariani, 7 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (requiring the prosecution
in an election fraud case to turn over to the defendants all Brady material in its
possession prior to the trial), with United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“Brady does not necessarily require that the prosecution turn over
exculpatory material before trial.”), and Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 479 (4th Cir.
1974) (holding that disclosure was timely when prosecutors released the results of
scientific tests on physical evidence after that evidence was introduced at trial).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006) (codifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Jencks v.
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importantly for purposes of this Article, the timing of production.39
Specifically, the Act prescribes the time at which production of
witness statements must be made by requiring the government to
produce a witness’s statement only after that witness has testified on
direct examination.40 A district court may not order the disclosure of
Jencks Act material earlier than the statute requires.41
The disparity between the timing requirements for the disclosure
of witness statements under the Jencks Act and other “evidence
favorable to an accused” under Brady and its progeny has been
justified by the courts, at the urging of prosecutors, as necessary in
part to protect government witnesses from harassment, intimidation,
and tampering.42 But although the Jencks Act was enacted in part “to
protect government witnesses from threats, bribery and perjury,” 43 it
applies regardless of whether there is any realistic danger of
interference with witnesses.44 In either event, courts have strictly
enforced the provisions of the Jencks Act.45
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), which held that in a criminal action, the
defendant is entitled to inspect the government’s written and recorded statements of
witnesses, and that the criminal action must be dismissed when the government
elects not to produce such statements).
38. See id. § 3500(b) (stating that prosecutors must produce “any statement . . . of
the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter
as to which the witness has testified”). A “statement” is defined as: (1) a written
statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a substantially verbatim transcription and contemporaneous recording of the
oral statement of the witness; or (3) a statement made by the witness to the grand
jury. Id. § 3500(e).
39. Id. § 3500(a).
40. See id. (“In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant)
shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has
testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.”).
41. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] District
Court’s power to order pretrial disclosure is constrained by the Jencks Act . . . .”);
United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lewis, 35
F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The district court may not require the government to
produce Jencks Act material relating to one of its witnesses until after the witness has
testified.”); see also United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. White, 750 F.2d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Algie, 667
F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1982).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 259 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(per curiam) (noting that “[w]hen the statements of persons other than the
defendant are sought, questions of witness safety necessarily arise”). The court in
Roberts explained that the term “witness safety” includes a concern for the safety of
those who make inculpatory co-conspirator declarations as well as witnesses who offer
testimony regarding such declarations. See id. (denying pretrial production because
of the risk that such production would “endanger[] government witnesses by
circumventing the protections of the Jencks Act”).
43. United States v. Walk, 533 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1975).
44. See United States v. Bobadilla-Lopez, 954 F.2d 519, 521 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he [Jencks Act’s] legislative history expresses a much greater concern with
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There are times when the Jencks Act and the Brady doctrine
overlap —i.e., Brady material may be contained within Jencks Act
witness statements.46 In such instances, courts disagree as to whether
the Jencks Act or the Brady line of cases governs the required timing
of disclosure. At least three United States Courts of Appeals have
directly held that the timing of production under the Jencks Act
trumps Brady.47 Federal prosecutors in these jurisdictions are not
required to disclose Jencks Act statements until after the witness
testifies on direct, even if the Jencks Act statements contain Brady
material.48 Moreover, district courts in these jurisdictions do not have
the discretion to order prosecutors to disclose the Jencks Act
statements, or the Brady material contained within them, any earlier
than the Act requires.49 However, three other United States Courts of

limiting the application of the Jencks decision so that it would not hamper the
workings of law enforcement by forcing wholesale disclosure of government
materials and files.”); Walk, 533 F.2d at 427–28 (Koehlsch, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for holding that the Jencks Act precluded the district court from
ordering pretrial disclosure of witness statements when the record was devoid of any
justifiable concern about perjury or intimidation of witnesses).
45. See supra note 41 (listing cases holding that district courts do not have the
authority to order the disclosure of Jencks material earlier than the statute allows).
However, as the Fourth Circuit has noted, “nothing in the Jencks Act prevents the
government from voluntarily agreeing to disclose witness statements prior to trial,”
see Lewis, 35 F.3d at 151, which often occurs. See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of
Jencks Witness Statements: Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655
(1999) (reporting on survey results showing that “prosecutors, for the most part,
provide Jencks witness statements to the defense in advance of the witness testifying,”
but noting a lack of uniformity among jurisdictions regarding the practice).
Furthermore, although the court may not mandate pretrial disclosure, the Jencks Act
does contain protections for defendants who may be prejudiced by disclosure in
accordance with the statutory timetable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (“[T]he court in its
discretion, upon application of [the] defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial
for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination of
such statement by [the] defendant and his preparation for its use in the trial.”); id.
§ 3500(d) (providing that where the government fails to meet its obligations to
produce statements in accordance with the Act, the trial court must strike the
testimony of the relevant witness and may, in its discretion, declare a mistrial).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Cerna, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1055–56 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (discussing the implications of the presence of Brady material in a Jencks Act
statement).
47. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The clear
and consistent rule of this circuit is that the intent of Congress expressed in the Act
must be adhered to and, thus, the government may not be compelled to disclose
Jencks Act material before trial.”); United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir.
1979) (“When the defense seeks evidence which qualifies as both Jencks Act and
Brady material, the Jencks Act standards control.”); United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d
465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“This Court and others have recognized that
the rule announced in Brady is not a pretrial remedy and was not intended to
override the mandate of the Jencks Act.”).
48. See, e.g., Cerna, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1055–56.
49. See, e.g., id. at 1056 (“District courts in this circuit have no authority to
override strict observance of the Jencks Act.”).
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Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion.50
B. Criminal Procedure Rules and Internal Guidelines
The Brady line of cases only establishes a floor —that is, the
minimum extent of a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose favorable
evidence.51 Other sources of law, such as the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the USAM, and state ethics rules can, and
sometimes do, impose broader obligations.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the primary
rule governing pretrial discovery in federal criminal cases,52 and it is,
in many respects, broader than the disclosures mandated by the Brady
line of cases. For example, Rule 16 requires prosecutors to disclose
to the defendant the defendant’s own statements (including
statements of an organizational defendant’s agents); certain tangible
evidence; and expert witnesses’ qualifications, reports, and materials
and information relied upon in rendering their opinions.53 Unlike a
prosecutor’s constitutional disclosure obligations,54 the disclosures
required under Rule 16 are triggered only by the defendant’s
request.55 Also unlike the constitutionally required disclosures, the

50. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is, of
course, a fundamental axiom of American law, rooted in our history as a people and
requiring no citations to authority, that the requirements of the Constitution prevail
over a statute in the event of a conflict.”); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384,
1414–15 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating that Jencks Act limitations on
discovery do not lessen the government’s Brady obligations to disclose exculpatory
material); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“[C]ompliance with the statutory requirements of the Jencks Act does not
necessarily satisfy the due process concerns of Brady.”). The Courts of Appeals for
the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have not ruled on
the matter, although some district courts within those circuits have also held that
Brady trumps Jencks. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 84–85 (D.
Mass. 1996) (“Given the important nature of the constitutional rights at stake, this
Court rules that the Brady requirement must effectively trump the Jencks Act where
the two are in direct conflict.”); United States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310, 1315
(D. Colo. 1996) (same); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 47, 54 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(same); cf. United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 791 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(adopting a “balancing” approach in an attempt to honor the intent behind the
Jencks Act by ordering disclosure as close to trial as possible while still allowing
defense to make effective use of information contained in statements).
51. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (noting that while Brady “only
mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or
statutory obligations”).
52. LAURIE L. LEVENSON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES HANDBOOK 222 (2009 ed.).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
54. See supra Part I.A (discussing the constitutional disclosure obligations
required by Brady and its progeny).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(G) (starting each of the seven subsections with
the phrase “[u]pon a defendant’s request”); LEVENSON, supra note 52, at 223.
However, many federal courts have adopted local rules that make the disclosures
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disclosure obligations under Rule 16 are reciprocal.56
Notably, Rule 16 does not impose a blanket obligation on the
government to disclose all exculpatory or impeachment evidence;57
instead, it only requires the disclosure of documents or tangible items
“material to preparing the defense,” if the defendant asks for them.58
Witness statements are not covered by Rule 16; in fact, the Rule
explicitly exempts Jencks Act witness statements from its coverage.59
And, while the Rule contains possible sanctions for violation of its
disclosure obligations,60 it does not specify the time by which the
required disclosures must be made.61
Another rule governing pretrial disclosure is Rule 26.2 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which covers the disclosure of
witness statements, and mirrors the Jencks Act in terms of the
prosecutor’s duty to disclose.62 Specifically, it requires a prosecutor
to produce to the defendant any statement63 of a government witness,
in the government’s possession, that relates to the subject matter of
the witness’s testimony, but only after that witness has testified on
direct examination.64 Like Rule 16, however, Rule 26.2 is triggered
only by the defendant’s request (motion) to obtain such material,65
automatic. See, e.g., D. MASS. R. 116.1(a)(1) (mandating disclosure pursuant to Rule
16 in felony and Class A misdemeanor cases regardless of whether the defendant
requested such information); D. NEB. R. 16.1 (same).
56. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)–(b) (setting forth pretrial disclosure
obligations for both prosecutors and defendants), with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (discussing the defendant’s due process rights to receive certain
evidence).
57. Brennan & King-Ries, supra note 29, at 329.
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i).
59. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) (“Nor does this rule authorize the discovery or
inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500 [the Jencks Act].”).
60. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) (providing that if a party violates Rule 16, the
court may order disclosure, grant a continuance, prohibit introduction of the
undisclosed evidence, or “enter any order that is just under the circumstances”).
61. Local rules generally govern the timing of discovery requests, and motions to
enforce the timing requirement are made under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. LEVENSON, supra note 52, at 223.
62. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a) (“After a witness other than the defendant has
testified on direct examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call the
witness, must order an attorney for the government or the defendant and the
defendant’s attorney to produce, for the examination and use of the moving party,
any statement of the witness that is in their possession and that relates to the subject
matter of the witness’s testimony.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 advisory committee’s
note (acknowledging that the substance of the Jencks Act was integrated into the
rules because provisions that are purely procedural should appear in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure).
63. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(f) (defining “statement” as a written statement
signed or otherwise approved by the witness; a verbatim recording of the witness’s
oral statement; or a recording or transcript of a witness’s statement to a grand jury).
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a).
65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a). However, as with Rule 16 materials, many federal
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and it imposes reciprocal obligations on the defendant to disclose to
the prosecution similar statements made by witnesses for the
defense.66
A third source of authority governing a prosecutor’s pretrial
disclosure obligations is the USAM—an internal guidance and policy
manual for DOJ attorneys.67 The USAM contains DOJ’s policy
regarding disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence,68
which goes beyond the constitutionally-required disclosure
obligations recognized by the Supreme Court.69 In terms of the
timing of disclosure, the policy provides that exculpatory information
“must be disclosed reasonably promptly after it is discovered,” 70 and
states that impeachment information “will typically be disclosed at a
reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently.” 71
The policy recognizes, however, that other significant interests—such

courts have adopted local rules that make the disclosures automatic. See supra note
55.
66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a) (imposing disclosure requirements on the
defendant as well as the government). When Rule 26.2 was proposed, it was
vigorously opposed by the ABA and other representatives of criminal defense
attorneys precisely because of the reciprocal obligation imposed on defendants to
disclose their witnesses’ statements. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Hearings on H.R. 7473 and H.R. 7817 Before the Subcomm. on Crim.
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 17–18 (1980) (statement of William
W. Greenhalgh, on behalf of the American Bar Association); id. at 31–41 (statement
of John J. Cleary, on behalf of the American Bar Association); id. at 114–15
(statement of Irwin Schwartz, on behalf of Federal Public and Community
Defenders); id. at 146–53 (statement of Robert L. Weinberg, Williams & Connolly,
on behalf of 170 Lawyers from thirty-two States and the District of Columbia).
Ironically, one of the hearing participants testifying against the addition of Rule 26.2
expressed concern that the government would make their Jencks Act witness
statement disclosures prior to trial and therefore expect the defense to do the same.
See id. at 140 (statement of Irwin Schwartz, on behalf of Federal Public and
Community Defenders).
67. See generally U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 25, § 1-1.100.
68. Id. § 9-5.001.
69. In several respects, the USAM either “encourages” or “requires” disclosure
that is broader in scope and earlier than constitutionally and statutorily required.
See, e.g., id. § 9-5.001(B)(1) (noting that while evidence not admissible at trial need
not be disclosed, prosecutors should disclose evidence of questionable admissibility);
id. § 9-5.001(F) (“[T]his policy encourages prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure in close questions of materiality . . . .”); see also id. § 9-5.001(C)
(“Department policy recognizes that a fair trial will often include examination of
relevant exculpatory or impeachment information that is significantly probative of
the issues before the court but that may not, on its own, result in an acquittal or, as is
often colloquially expressed, make the difference between guilt and innocence. As a
result, this policy requires disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond that
which is ‘material’ to guilt as articulated in [relevant Supreme Court precedent].”);
id. § 9-5.001(C)(1)–(4) (enumerating four additional categories of exculpatory and
impeachment information that “must” be disclosed, although not constitutionally
required).
70. Id. § 9-5.001(D)(1).
71. Id. § 9-5.001(D)(2).
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as witness security —may cause the prosecutor to conclude that it is
not appropriate to provide early disclosure.72 In such cases, the
USAM simply directs prosecutors to make disclosures “at a time and
in a manner consistent with the policy embodied in the Jencks Act.” 73
When a prosecutor feels that early disclosure is not appropriate due
to security concerns, however, she must obtain a supervisor’s approval
to withhold impeachment information before trial and exculpatory
information past the “reasonably promptly” time period.74 The
USAM does not, though, have the force of law or confer any
enforceable rights on defendants.75
C. Ethics Rules
Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth
the “special responsibilities” of a prosecutor in a criminal case.76
Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . .
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a
protective order of the tribunal.” 77 Nearly every state has adopted
Rule 3.8(d);78 at least thirty-one states have adopted the rule
72. Id.
73. Id.; see id. § 9-5.001(D)(2) (stating that the USAM is intended to promote fair
trials by requiring timely disclosure of appropriate exculpatory and impeachment
information, but recognizing that countervailing interests, such as witness security
and national security, may require delayed or restricted disclosure). The policy does
not explicitly address Jencks Act witness statements as a category separate and apart
from the impeachment information that may be contained therein. Indeed, the
oblique reference to the Jencks Act mentioned above—from the section concerning
the timing of disclosure of impeachment information—is the only mention of the
Jencks Act in the policy.
74. Id. § 9-5.001(D)(4).
75. See id. § 9-5.001(F) (clarifying that the expanded disclosure policy in the
USAM does not provide additional rights or remedies for defendants). Courts have
agreed. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). A prosecutor who violates
the USAM can, however, be investigated by DOJ’s Office of Professional
Responsibility, disciplined or dismissed from DOJ, and reported to the relevant
licensing bar. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Hon. David F. Levi,
Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2 n.2 (June 5, 2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016
%20Part%201.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Letter].
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009). Rule 3.8 is unique
among the Model Rules in that it is the only rule drafted specifically for one segment
of the profession. See Hans P. Sinha, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Material, PROSECUTOR, Jan.–Mar. 2008, 20, at 20 (noting that Rule 3.8 is
the only such rule and commenting that “[s]ignificantly, there are no special rules
for criminal defense lawyers, tax lawyers or corporate lawyers, or any other type of
lawyers”).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
78. Model ethics rules promulgated by the ABA bind attorneys only when

SCHIMPFF.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/27/2012 12:09 PM

2012] ETHICS AND THE LAW ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE

1743

verbatim,79 while a handful of others have adopted modified versions
of the rule.80 A few other state rules regarding disclosure obligations
are based on comparable provisions that were contained in the ABA’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor to the
Model Rules.81
Whether, and to what extent, federal prosecutors were even subject
to state ethics rules was the subject of considerable debate for years.82
The debate was largely resolved, however, with the passage of the socalled McDade Amendment in 1998.83 Pursuant to the McDade
Amendment, all U.S. government attorneys, including, and
especially, federal prosecutors,84 are subject to the ethics rules of
“each State where such attorney[s] engage[] in [their] duties, to the
same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that
State.” 85 Accordingly, a federal prosecutor must abide by the
version —or versions — of Rule 3.8(d) operating in each state in
which she practices.86 A federal prosecutor who fails to do so may be
adopted by a jurisdiction’s legislature or court. Note, supra note 16, at 2082 n.11
(citing JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER
3–4 (2d ed. 1996)).
79. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000,
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 app. at 482 & n.75 (2009).
80. Id. app. at 483 & n.76. For example, a few states have added a requirement
that the failure to disclose must be willful or intentional for an ethical violation to
occur. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009) (requiring that
prosecutors not willfully fail to make timely disclosure); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2012) (prohibiting intentional failure to disclose). Some states
have also modified the rule to specifically address the timing of disclosure. See, e.g.,
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (requiring disclosure “at the earliest
practical time”); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (requiring disclosure “at a
time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible”).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7-103 (B) (2009) (providing that
“[a] public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make
timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to a defendant who has no
counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government
lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense or reduce the punishment”). For a brief history of the evolution of the
model ethics rules, see Note, supra note 16, at 2082–83, and authorities cited therein.
82. See Note, supra note 16, at 2084–88 (illustrating the history of the dispute as it
transpired between DOJ and the courts).
83. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-118 (1998) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 530B (2006)).
84. Note, supra note 16, at 2088 (noting that the amendment was introduced
“[t]o restrain the perceived overzealousness of federal prosecutors and to prevent
DOJ from exempting its prosecutors from ethics rules”). The provision’s chief
sponsor in the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Joseph McDade, was
himself the subject of an eight-year federal criminal investigation that ultimately
resulted in his acquittal of all charges. Id. at 2088 n.70.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006).
86. As previously mentioned, although nearly all states have some version of Rule
3.8(d), there are variations among them. This often presents a challenge for DOJ
attorneys at “Main Justice,” who frequently work on cases in multiple jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Little, supra note 15, at 370 n.68 (providing the “Unabomber” case as a
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subjected to disciplinary sanctions.
A strong argument can be made that, as written, Rule 3.8(d) is not
inconsistent with the existing, long-standing constitutional and
statutory framework governing a federal prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations. Under the Brady line of cases, a prosecutor must disclose
exculpatory and impeachment evidence —unless it is contained
within Jencks Act witness statements—in a timely fashion, so that the
defense may effectively use it at trial.87 Thus, under this view,
“timely” equates to “in time for the defense to make effective use of
it at trial,” which, as discussed, is determined on a case-by-case basis.88
With respect to Jencks Act statements, it has been DOJ’s position that
the two can be reconciled by reading “timely” to mean “at an
appropriate or suitable time,” i.e., at a time provided by law.89 In the
case of Jencks Act statements and the exculpatory and impeachment
information contained therein, this means that disclosure is “timely”
so long as it is made within the timeframe established by statute and
assented to by the courts; in many jurisdictions, this will mean after
the witness testifies on direct at trial.90 Thus far, federal courts have
agreed with DOJ’s interpretation,91 to the extent they have
considered the matter at all,92 and research has not revealed any
specific instance in which DOJ attorneys had to work in multiple jurisdictions); see
also The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 44
(1999) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen.) (describing the
problems that can arise when DOJ attorneys must comply with a variety of divergent
local rules).
87. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text (detailing prosecutorial
responsibility to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence pursuant to Brady
and its progeny).
88. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate
timing for disclosure).
89. See, e.g., Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Production of Favorable Information at 11–12, United States v. Colacurcio, No.
CR09-209RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2010), ECF No. 188.
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR09-209RAJ, slip op. at 7 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 9, 2010) ECF No. 222 (order denying motion to compel production of
favorable information) (“[T]he court sees no conflict between [Washington Rule of
Professional Conduct] 3.8(d) and the Jencks Act. The ethical rule requires ‘timely’
disclosure of favorable evidence and information. The Jencks Act decrees that for
the statement of a government witness, production is timely so long as it comes after
the witness finishes direct examination.”).
92. Federal courts are not, of course, the final arbiters of the state disciplinary
rules. Many federal courts have, however, adopted state ethics rules as part of their
local federal court rules. See, e.g., W.D. WASH. G.R. 2(e)(2) (stating that attorneys
appearing in the district court must comply with state ethics rules). The federal
courts are called upon to decide whether these rules have been violated, for
example, in the context of sanction motions or contempt proceedings. See Zacharias,
supra note 15, at 453 n.101. However, “[t]o the extent discipline of a lawyer is the
appropriate sanction and cannot easily be accomplished through contempt, the
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instance in which a federal prosecutor has been disciplined by a state
bar authority for adhering to this interpretation. Thus, an uneasy
truce has existed since the passage of the McDade Amendment made
Model Rule 3.8(d) clearly and directly applicable to federal
prosecutors.
This situation is not likely to survive, however, in the wake of the
recent issuance of the Opinion. As will be discussed more fully in
Part III.A, among other things, the Opinion interprets Rule 3.8(d) as
requiring disclosure of information favorable to the defense “as soon
as reasonably practical,” “once known to the prosecutor.” 93 The
Opinion does not make an exception for such information when
contained within Jencks Act statements; indeed, it does not mention
the Jencks Act at all. Therefore, the ABA Ethics Committee’s
interpretation of “timely” as explained in the Opinion puts Rule
3.8(d) in direct conflict with the Jencks Act. Requiring that a
prosecutor disclose information favorable to the defense contained
within Jencks Act statements as soon as practical after she learns of it,
which is the practical consequence of the Opinion, cannot be
squared with a statutory rule that does not require such disclosure
until after a witness has testified during trial.
II. THE PUSH FOR MORE DISCLOSURE
The full history of the debate between defense attorneys and
prosecutors over the appropriate scope and timing of the disclosure
of evidence favorable to the defense is beyond the purview of this
Article, as are the merits of the underlying debate. Rather, this
Article seeks to analyze the recent history and current status of
specific attempts to push the sources of law enumerated above in the
direction of requiring prosecutors to make more and earlier
disclosures to the defense. These efforts, none of which has been
fully successful in the eyes of proponents, should be seen as the
backdrop, and perhaps the primary motivation, for the ABA Ethics
Committee’s promulgation of Formal Opinion 09-454. Having tried,
and largely failed, to change the law in favor of defendants’ interests

federal courts currently have little option but to refer misconduct to the state bar.”
Id. In addition to referrals by the federal courts, federal prosecutors also may be
referred to state bar disciplinary authorities by their adversaries in litigation, i.e.,
defense counsel, see Little, supra note 15, at 373–74 (discussing one high-profile
example of such a referral), or by DOJ itself, see McNulty Letter supra note 75, at 2
n.2 (noting that a prosecutor who violates the U.S. Attorney’s Manual can be
investigated, disciplined by DOJ, or referred to the bar).
93. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6
(2009).
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in earlier and broader disclosure, the proponents of these failed
measures found a more sympathetic audience in the Committee,
which has chosen to exercise its historically considerable influence by
pushing through, via an ethics opinion, substantive changes to the
disclosure rules that have been otherwise unattainable.
A. Efforts to Extend the Brady Doctrine
Critics of the disclosure obligations imposed by federal law are
primarily troubled by three things: (1) the materiality standard
enshrined in the Brady line of cases; (2) the perceived laxity or
uncertainty regarding when disclosures are required to be made; and
(3) the roadblock posed by the Jencks Act. Formal Opinion 09-454
gets to the heart of all three, whereas decades of litigation over the
scope of the Brady doctrine did not achieve the desired result.
As a matter of constitutional law, a prosecutor need only disclose
material evidence, and evidence is material only if it has a reasonable
probability of altering the jury’s verdict.94
Despite numerous
commentators arguing, and the Supreme Court itself acknowledging,
that it is somewhat anomalous to use a single standard to govern both
pretrial decision-making and post-trial review,95 the use of the
materiality standard endures. A few district court decisions have held
that Brady requires the government to disclose all favorable evidence
before trial (not just material evidence),96 but such cases remain the
exception.
With respect to the timing issue, the Supreme Court has thus far
resisted pinpointing exactly when Brady disclosures must be made;
there is no bright line rule and, as discussed above, whether
particular information was disclosed “in time for the defense to make
use of the information at trial” is determined on a case-by-case basis.97
The Supreme Court has weighed in, however, on when such

94. Christopher Deal, Note, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty To
Disclose and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1783 & n.27 (2007).
95. See sources cited supra note 29 (providing a summary of scholarly criticism);
see also Deal, supra note 94, at 1790–95, 1801–03 (discussing how the Supreme Court
has grappled with the definition of materiality as it pertains to pretrial disclosure
obligations, and summarizing commentators’ arguments that the materiality
definition is unworkable as a pretrial standard).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
that the government must disclose all favorable evidence); United States v. Carter,
313 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (E.D. Wisc. 2004) (same); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1999 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (same); see also United States v. Phair, No.
CR12-16RAJ, slip. op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. June 19, 2012) (order granting defendant’s
motion for discovery) (following the pretrial disclosure standard outlined in
Sudikoff).
97. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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disclosure is not required: prior to a defendant pleading guilty. In
2002, the Court decided United States v. Ruiz,98 a case that raised the
issue only indirectly, and held that due process does not require that
prosecutors disclose favorable evidence (at least not impeachment
evidence) to the defense prior to a guilty plea.99 In Ruiz, the
defendant claimed that the terms of a “fast-track” plea agreement,
which would have required her to waive her right to receive Brady
material, were unconstitutional.100 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated by
the government’s conditioning a fast-track plea offer on the
defendant’s waiver of her right to impeachment information.101 The
Court then went further and held that under Brady, defendants have
no constitutional right to disclosure of information relevant to either
impeachment or affirmative defenses prior to pleading guilty.102 The
Ruiz decision was considered a major set-back by proponents of
earlier and broader disclosure, and some have suggested that it was
the impetus behind the push to amend Rule 16.103
Finally, with respect to the Jencks Act, advocates for criminal
defendants have at least succeeded in creating a circuit split as to
whether Brady trumps the Jencks Act as a matter of constitutional
law.104 Thus, in some jurisdictions, district courts could order pretrial
disclosure of Brady material contained within Jencks Act statements, if
such disclosure would otherwise be necessary to meet the “in time for
the defense to make effective use of it at trial” standard.105 In other
jurisdictions—including within the largest circuit, the Ninth—
however, the Jencks Act remains an impediment to obtaining such
disclosure.106 Although the government can voluntarily choose to
disclose Jencks Act statements or the Brady material contained
therein before the witness has testified at trial,107 a defendant has no
98. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
99. Id. at 625.
100. Id. at 626.
101. Id. at 633.
102. Id.
103. See R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1445–46 (2011) (discussing the efforts
to amend Rule 16 that began after, and as a result of, Ruiz).
104. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 50 (listing courts that have upheld the superiority of Brady
obligations over the Jencks Act).
106. See United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the
defense seeks information which qualifies as both Jencks Act and Brady material, the
Jencks Act standards control.” (quoting United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 453, 455
(9th Cir. 1979))); see also supra note 47 (identifying cases from additional
jurisdictions that give primacy to the Jencks Act).
107. See supra note 45 (noting that nothing in the Jencks Act prevents prosecutors
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pretrial judicial recourse if the government declines to do so.108
B. Efforts to Amend the Jencks Act
There appears to have been only one serious, but unsuccessful,
effort to amend the Jencks Act to broaden a defendant’s right to
pretrial discovery.109 In 1985, Representative John Conyers (D-MI)
sponsored H.R. 4007, the Jencks Act Amendments Act of 1985.110
The bill’s stated purpose was “to provide more useful discovery rights
for defendants in criminal cases,” 111 and it would have required the
government, upon request by the defendant, to “promptly . . . make
available” the names and addresses of anyone known by the
government to have “knowledge of facts relevant to the offense
charged,” 112 along with a copy of any related witness statements.113
Under the proposed amendments, the government would have been
permitted to file an ex parte motion for a protective order.114 If the
court determined that disclosure would “constitute an imminent
danger to another person” or “constitute a threat to the integrity of
the judicial process,” the court could have denied, restricted, or
deferred such disclosure until after the witness had testified on direct
examination at trial.115 The measure was supported by the ABA,116
from voluntarily disclosing witness statements prior to trial).
108. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
109. H.R. 4007, 99th Cong. (1985). Separately, Congress considered amending
the Jencks Act to be more restrictive of defendants’ rights in 1979–80, in response to
the so-called “graymail” problem of defendants in national security-related cases
threatening to disclose classified information during trial, thereby discouraging the
government from prosecuting such cases. These proposed amendments to the
Jencks Act would have allowed the court to order excision of classified information
from witness statements, but were never enacted. See Classified Information
Procedures Act, S. 1482, 96th Cong. § 8(b) (as reported by the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, June 18, 1980); Graymail: Hearing on S. 1482 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 22 (1980). This issue was
subsequently addressed with the passage of the Classified Information Procedures
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1–16 (2006)). As discussed below, Congress also considered—and rejected—in
1980 a proposal to require the government to disclose its witness list prior to trial
(which H.R. 4007 would also have done), but that discussion centered around
proposed changes to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not to the
Jencks Act itself. See infra note 125. See generally infra note 123 (discussing Congress’s
role in the federal criminal rulemaking process).
110. H.R. 4007, 99th Cong. (1985).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 2(a).
113. Id. § 2(a)(2).
114. Id. § 2(b)(1).
115. Id.
116. Jencks Act Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 4007 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 3 (1986) (statement of Gerard F.
Treanor, Jr., on behalf of the American Bar Association); id. at 291 (statement of
Paul F. Rothstein, on behalf of American Bar Association).
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the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL),117
and various defender groups,118 but was opposed by DOJ.119 The bill
never made it out of committee.
C. Efforts to Amend Rule 16 and DOJ’s Recent Changes to USAM
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been
amended many times since its adoption in 1944, nearly always to
expand the scope of required disclosures.120 The “recent” push to
amend Rule 16 to make prosecutors’ disclosure obligations more
expansive dates back to 2003, when the American College of Trial
Lawyers (ACTL) proposed adding a new section to Rule 16,121 which
would require disclosure, within fourteen days of a defense request,
of “all information favorable to the defendant”—without regard to
materiality—that is known to the prosecutor or any investigating
agency.122
Acting on ACTL’s proposal in 2007, the Judicial
Conference’s Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (“Advisory

117. Id. at 274 (statement of Robert L. Weinberg, on behalf of National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
118. Id. at 31 (statement of Thomas W. Hillier, on behalf of Federal Public and
Community Defenders); id. at 197–98 (statement of Lucien B. Campbell, on behalf
of Federal Public and Community Defenders).
119. Id. at 166 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
120. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (chronicling the rule’s
revisions that have expanded the scope of pretrial discovery).
121. See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting
Minutes 31 (June 11–12, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST06-2007-min.pdf [hereinafter Standing Comm.
June 2007 Minutes].
122. AMER. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE OF
FAVORABLE INFORMATION UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 AND 16, at
17 (2003), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=62.
The ACTL is a voluntary professional organization of trial lawyers, and membership
(or “fellowship”) is extended by invitation only. See About Us—Membership, AM. COLL.
OF TRIAL LAWYERS, http://www.actl.com/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutUs/
Membership/default.htm (last visited July 14, 2012). Its mission is “to maintain[]
and improv[e] the standards of trial practice, the administration of justice and the
ethics of the profession.” About Us—Overview, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_Us (last visited July 14,
2012). The ACTL purports “to speak with a balanced voice on important issues
affecting the administration of justice” because it draws members from all litigation
practice areas. About Us—Membership, supra. A search of its online membership
directory, however, turns up only twenty-five attorneys who practice “criminal
prosecution” (and of these, nine actually list a private firm as their place of
employment), see Attorney Directory, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
http://www.actl.com/Source/Members/actl_Search.cfm?section=Attorney_Director
y (search “Practice Area” for “Criminal Prosecution”) (last visited July 14, 2012),
and 377 attorneys who practice “criminal defense” (two of whom list a prosecutor’s
office as their place of employment), id. (search “Practice Area” for “Criminal
Defense”) (last visited July 14, 2012).
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Committee”) recommended to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (“Standing Committee”) that Rule 16 be
amended.123 The Advisory Committee’s proposal was similar to what
ACTL requested:
it would have, in essence, eliminated the
materiality requirement contained in the Rule and enshrined in the
Brady line of cases, and allowed a court to set a pretrial disclosure
date.124 However, the Advisory Committee revised the original ACTL
proposal with respect to the timing of disclosure. Specifically, the
Advisory Committee changed the requirement that prosecutors
disclose all information favorable to the defendant (which would
include both exculpatory and impeachment information) within
fourteen days of a defendant’s request to a provision allowing the court to
order pretrial disclosure of both exculpatory and impeachment
information, but restricting the court from requiring disclosure of
impeachment information any sooner than fourteen days prior to trial.125

123. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 250–58 (May 19, 2007) [hereinafter ADVISORY
COMM. MAY 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/Reports/CR05-2007.pdf. The rulemaking process is described in
detail on the U.S. Courts website. How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-works.aspx (last
visited Aug. 16, 2012). Briefly, the Judicial Conference of the United States
promulgates rules of federal practice, procedure, and evidence under authority
delegated by Congress to the federal judiciary pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). The Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, commonly referred to as the “Standing Committee,” coordinates the
Judicial Conference’s rulemaking responsibilities. See id. § 2073(b). Under the
Standing Committee are five advisory committees, including the Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules. See id. § 2073(a)(2). The Advisory Committee considers
proposed rule changes and, if it feels that a particular change in the rules would be
appropriate, it prepares a draft amendment and requests approval from the Standing
Committee to publish it for public comment. The Standing Committee may decline
to approve publication, which, as discussed below, happened here. See infra notes
129–131 and accompanying text. Otherwise, following a period of public notice and
comment, the Advisory Committee considers the comments and makes a final
recommendation to the Standing Committee, which can accept, reject, or modify the
proposal. If the Standing Committee approves a proposed rule change, it transmits
it to the Judicial Conference for approval. If the Judicial Conference approves the
proposed amendment, it transmits it to the Supreme Court along with any other
proposed amendments it has approved that year. If the Supreme Court approves, it
“prescribes” the amendment and transmits it to Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072,
2074–2075. Congress then has seven months to act; if Congress does not enact
legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, they automatically take effect. See id.
§§ 2074–2075.
124. ADVISORY COMM. MAY 2007 REPORT, supra note 123, at 354.
125. Id. at 24–25. A similar, but even more modest proposal with respect to
witness disclosure (which would have required the government to disclose its witness
list three days before trial) was approved by the Supreme Court in 1974, but it was
rejected by Congress.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note
(documenting that in 1974, the Conference adopted a Senate proposal, which made
the names and addresses of a party’s witnesses nondiscoverable before trial).
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Nevertheless, DOJ opposed the Advisory Committee’s proposed
amendment on the grounds that eliminating the materiality
requirement would be contrary to prevailing law, upset the carefully
considered balance between a defendant’s right to a fair trial and the
interest in the finality of judgments, and potentially violate the
reputational and privacy interests of witnesses and other participants
in the criminal justice system. DOJ further objected that the proposal
would result in a scope and timing requirement for disclosures that
would be inconsistent with the Jencks Act.126 Specifically, DOJ
contended that the proposed amendment would in effect require
pretrial disclosure of all impeachment information, a requirement
that would be contrary to the Jencks Act, particularly given how
frequently potential impeachment information is found in witness
statements.127 Even though the proposed amendment would have
limited the disclosure period to no more than fourteen days before
trial, in a lengthy trial, that could mean disclosing the information
several months before a particular witness testifies.128
The Standing Committee deferred consideration of the proposal
indefinitely in June 2007,129 because of disagreement among its
members regarding whether a need for change had been
demonstrated, the merits of the proposed changes, and whether the
committee should defer to DOJ’s changes to the USAM and the
arguments DOJ made in its opposition to the proposed
amendments.130 Clearly, concern that the proposed amendment

126. See McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 1–3, 6–11, 14. DOJ further argued that
the amendment was unnecessary because DOJ had recently amended the USAM to
expand disclosure obligations above and beyond what was constitutionally and
statutorily required, and it felt that those changes provided a workable solution that
should be given a chance to be proven effective. Id. at 2–3, 30–33. For a discussion
of the recent amendments to the USAM, see infra notes 145–146 and accompanying
text, and supra notes 68–74.
127. McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 14. Although DOJ focused its objections in
this regard on the impeachment evidence provisions of the proposed amendment,
Jencks Act statements can contain classic exculpatory information as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 789 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Jencks Act
statements may, but do not always, also constitute exculpatory . . . evidence.”);
United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 84 (D. Mass. 1996) (discussing exculpatory
Jencks Act statements).
128. McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 11.
129. U.S. COURTS, HISTORY OF COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENTS TO
RULE 16: TABLE OF CONTENTS WITH SUMMARY OF ACTION 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%20Table%20of%20Contents.pdf
[hereinafter HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION]; Standing Comm. June 2007 Minutes, supra
note 121, at 39–40.
130. See Standing Comm. June 2007 Minutes, supra note 121, at 31–40 (describing
various disagreements between committee members); see also Advisory Comm. on
Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 8 (Sept. 27–28, 2010) [hereinafter Advisory Comm.
Sept. 2010 Minutes], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
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would bring Rule 16 into conflict with the Jencks Act played a role in
the Standing Committee’s decision to shelve the proposal,131 as it has
throughout the history of attempts to amend the Rule.132
More recently, in 2009, the Advisory Committee reconstituted its
subcommittee on Rule 16,133 and continued to consider similar
changes to the Rule.134 The proposal that emerged was expressly an
attempt to minimize the potential for conflict with the Jencks Act.135
Specifically, the discussion draft would have required earlier
disclosure for exculpatory information (at least fourteen days before
trial) than for impeachment information (at least seven days before
trial).136 The draft retained the separate regime for disclosing witness
statements currently embodied in the Jencks Act, Rule 26.2, and Rule
16(a)(2).137 Although it did not require disclosure of the statement
itself, this draft did, however, require pretrial disclosure of “a written
summary of any inconsistent oral or witness statement by the
witness.” 138 The discussion draft also provided the government with
unreviewable authority not to disclose exculpatory or impeachment

RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR09-2010-min.pdf
(characterizing
DOJ’s
opposition to amending Rule 16 in 2007 as “a significant factor in the Standing
Committee’s decision not to approve the proposed amendment and to recommit the
matter to the [Advisory] Committee for further study. Essentially, the 2007 process
was halted based on [DOJ’s] promise to address disclosure problems internally”).
131. See Standing Comm. June 2007 Minutes, supra note 121, at 36 (discussing the
fact that the proposed rule is in conflict with the Jencks Act and with constitutionally
sound principles); see also supra notes 126–127, 130 and accompanying text
(discussing DOJ’s opposition to the proposed rule, which relied heavily on the Jencks
Act, and its effect on the Standing Committee).
132. See HISTORY OF CONSIDERATION, supra note 129, at 12–21 (summarizing
discussions between 1986 and 2003 of various proposals to require pretrial disclosure
of names and statements of witnesses, and noting that the Advisory Committee
ultimately voted in October 2003 against reviving consideration of any such
amendment).
133. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, REPORT TO STANDING COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (Dec. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CR12-2009.pdf
(reporting creation of a Rule 16 subcommittee in response to concerns raised by
Hon. Emmett Sullivan, presiding judge in the Stevens case).
134. See, e.g., Memorandum from Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Criminal Rules, to Members, Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, 1 (Mar.
21, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Agenda%20Books/Criminal/CR2011-04.pdf [hereinafter Tallman Memo]
(summarizing recent activity of the Rule 16 subcommittee and outlining the current
proposed amendment to Rule 16 for discussion at the Advisory Committee’s
upcoming April 2011 meeting).
135. See id. at 2–5 (pointing out measures taken to avoid potential conflict with
the Jencks Act and suggesting that “a key issue for [Advisory] Committee discussion
[at its upcoming meeting] is whether [the proposal] is consistent with the Jencks Act
and Rule 26.2”).
136. Id. at 2–3, 6.
137. Id. at 3–4.
138. Id. at 4, 6.
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information prior to trial if it believed that pretrial disclosure would
threaten the safety of witnesses, victims, or the public; jeopardize
national security; or lead to an obstruction of justice.139
Nevertheless, DOJ objected that the discussion draft did not go far
enough to ameliorate conflict with the Jencks Act, arguing that
inherent in presenting a summary of inconsistent statements is the
disclosure of portions of the underlying statements themselves and
the identification of the witness at issue.140 Ultimately, the Advisory
Committee voted in April 2011 not to pursue an amendment to Rule
16,141 and the Rule 16 subcommittee was formally disbanded later
that year.142 Given the Advisory Committee’s stated commitment to
avoiding conflict with the Jencks Act143 and to securing DOJ’s support
139. See id. at 4–5, 7 (explaining that the draft sought to balance the new
disclosure obligations with the government’s need to withhold such information
when one of the listed interests was threatened).
140. See Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules 7–10 (Mar. 18,
2011), [hereinafter Breuer Letter], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Criminal/CR2011-04.pdf (setting forth
DOJ’s objections to the most recent discussion draft).
141. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, REPORT TO STANDING COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10–12 (May 12, 2011) [hereinafter ADVISORY
COMM. MAY 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CR05-2011.pdf (explaining the reasoning behind
the decision, which included seeking to avoid conflict with the Jencks Act). Prior to
reaching this decision, the Advisory Committee, among other things, commissioned
the largest survey ever conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, which examined
disclosure practices around the country and surveyed judges’, prosecutors’, and
defense attorneys’ attitudes on disclosure and the need to amend (or not) Rule 16,
see LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
RULES (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Publications/Rule16Rep.pdf, and convened a special mini-conference in
Houston, Texas, to discuss the survey results with defense counsel, prosecutors,
judges, academics, agency counsel, and crime victims’ representatives. ADVISORY
COMM. MAY 2011 REPORT, supra, at 10. Rather than revising Rule 16, the Advisory
Committee has recommended that the Federal Judicial Center create a Best Practices
Guide for Criminal Discovery, include a discovery checklist in the District Judges
Benchbook, and implement more educational programs for district judges on
overseeing pretrial criminal discovery. See id. at 12.
142. See Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 8–9 (Oct. 31, 2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/
CR10-2011-min.pdf (noting that all subcommittees other than Rule 12, 11, and 6(e)
Subcommittees have completed their work and ordering them dissolved).
143. See ADVISORY COMM. MAY 2011 REPORT, supra note 141, at 11 (noting the
Judicial Conference’s policy of avoiding rule changes that would conflict with
existing law); Tallman Memo, supra note 134, at 4 (explaining the reasoning behind
provisions in the draft proposal as avoiding conflict with the Jencks Act); see also
Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes 14 (Apr. 11–12, 2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20
Books/Criminal/CR2011-10.pdf (summarizing comment by Judge Tallman, the
immediate past chair of the Advisory Committee, that “the Jencks Act is almost an
insurmountable obstacle” to requiring early disclosure of impeachment information,

SCHIMPFF.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/27/2012 12:09 PM

1754

[Vol. 61:1729

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

for any amendment going forward,144 it seems highly unlikely that
there will be any imminent changes to Rule 16 that would impose
disclosure obligations on prosecutors that conflict with the Jencks
Act.
In sum, proponents of broader and earlier disclosure have been
unable to secure an amendment to Rule 16 that would guarantee full
pretrial disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment information
regardless of its source (i.e., regardless of whether it may be
contained in a Jencks Act witness statement, as is often the case), and
are unlikely to reach this outcome in the foreseeable future.
Undoubtedly, the defense bar is not and will not be satisfied with
what comes out of the Rule 16 process. The Rule 16 debate initiated
by the ACTL proposal has, however, resulted in significant changes
within DOJ. The disclosure obligations in the USAM, which go above
and beyond what is otherwise constitutionally and legally required,
were added to the USAM in 2006145 and were a direct result of the
ongoing discussions around amending Rule 16.146
More recently, DOJ has issued additional guidance147 and
implemented a series of initiatives designed to improve disclosure
policies and the practices of federal prosecutors.148 Among other
even if prosecutors were permitted to provide summaries of witness statements rather
than the statements themselves); Advisory Comm. Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note
130, at 9 (documenting the Committee’s hesitation about overruling Jencks through
the supersession clause by amending Rule 16 and noting that resort to the
supersession clause is a last resort and that it is Judicial Conference policy that such
conflicts should be avoided if at all possible).
144. See Advisory Comm. Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 130, at 9 (noting Judge
Tallman’s belief that DOJ’s support could help prevent Congress from interfering
with the Committee’s rulemaking); id. at 8 (observing that DOJ’s “continued
opposition to changing Rule 16 is problematic for the future success of any proposed
amendment”).
145. DOJ’s new Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment
Information, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 25, § 9-5.001, took effect on
October 19, 2006. McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 3.
146. See McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 2 (contending that the provision was the
result of “unprecedented effort” by DOJ to collaborate with Rule 16 subcommittee
members while preserving the balanced discovery system Congress envisioned); id. at
2 n.1 (noting that during the drafting process, DOJ obtained the approval of
Committee members with respect to the USAM’s coverage of exculpatory
information).
147. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Guidance Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.pdf.
148. See Breuer Letter, supra note 140, at 2–4 (summarizing the various programs
DOJ has implemented in order to better train and educate prosecutors on discovery
obligations and characterizing these efforts as having changed the culture at DOJ);
see also Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations:
Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161,
2163 & n.8 (2010) (outlining the recent efforts by DOJ to better educate prosecutors
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things, DOJ has directed each U.S. Attorney’s Office to designate a
discovery coordinator, appointed a new national coordinator for
criminal discovery initiatives, and instituted new training
requirements and programs for federal prosecutors regarding their
discovery obligations.149
Critics of federal prosecutors’ disclosure practices are not,
however, satisfied with DOJ’s reforms.150 Neither the new provisions
of the USAM, nor the recent DOJ guidance document on discovery,
create judicially enforceable remedies for defendants.151
Furthermore, DOJ policy has not abandoned the materiality standard
as a guiding principle,152 nor does it guarantee pretrial disclosure,
particularly of impeachment information.153 Finally, at least one
prominent commentator has questioned DOJ’s recent emphasis on
training, suggesting that policy and culture are the problems, not a
lack of education.154
D. Efforts to Amend Rule 3.8
Beginning in 1997, the ABA undertook “a much anticipated
overhaul of its entire body of ethics rules.” 155 This initiative was

about their disclosure obligations).
149. See Breuer Letter, supra note 140, at 3–4 (detailing new training initiatives
that include improving existing instruction and providing courses designed for newly
hired prosecutors); Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken in Response
to the Report of the Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case
Management Working Group (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
dag/dag-memo.html (indicating that each U.S. Attorney’s Office has now named a
discovery coordinator); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Andrew Goldsmith
Appointed as National Coordinator of Criminal Discovery Initiatives (Jan. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-dag-043.html
(announcing appointment of a national coordinator for criminal discovery
initiatives).
150. See, e.g., Green, supra note 148, at 2162, 2167–69 (describing these changes as
merely a response to a series of federal criminal cases—including the Senator Ted
Stevens fiasco— where DOJ was embarrassed by discovery failures, and arguing that
DOJ’s guidance fails to establish new disclosure obligations and errs in leaving
disclosure to the discretion of prosecutors).
151. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 25, § 9-5.001(F) (clarifying that the
new policy neither creates a “general right of discovery” nor “provide[s] defendants
with any additional rights or remedies”); Guidance Memo, supra note 147, at 1
(same); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
152. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 25, § 9-5.001(B)(1).
153. Id. §9-5.001(D); Guidance Memo, supra note 147, at 6.
154. See Green, supra note 148, at 2172–73 (suggesting that prosecutors view their
goal as obtaining convictions, and discovery obligations are not fundamental to that
mission).
155. Kuckes, supra, note 79, at 429; see also Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 441, 441 (2002).
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popularly known as “Ethics 2000.” 156 Although the ABA adopted
numerous changes to the Model Rules as a result of Ethics 2000,157 it
made no substantive changes to the text of Rule 3.8,158 much less to
Rule 3.8(d)’s disclosure provisions. Notably, the ABA expressly
“decided against attempting to explicate the relationship between
paragraph (d) . . . and the prosecutor’s constitutional obligations
under Brady and its progeny.” 159 Instead, the ABA reissued Rule 3.8
with no substantive revisions, having made only one change to the
accompanying commentary that “arguably watered down its
effect.” 160
The ABA’s “failure” to amend Rule 3.8 has subsequently been
widely lamented by commentators who contend that the current
version is inadequate.161 But at the time, however, while the Ethics
2000 Commission received many submissions from lawyers and
representative organizations proposing amendments to various
model rules, few pertained to Rule 3.8.162 Bruce Green, a law
professor at Fordham University and past chair of the ABA Criminal
Justice Section, was one of the few who did raise concerns about Rule
3.8 during the Ethics 2000 process;163 notably, he was also, in his
former capacity as a member of the ABA Ethics Committee, one of

156. Kuckes, supra, note 79, at 429. The Ethics 2000 Commission was formally
known as the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the amendments decided upon by the
Commission were actually adopted by the ABA in February 2002. Love, supra note
155, at 441, 44.
157. See Love, supra note 155, at 443 (noting that during the course of its work, the
Ethics 2000 Commission determined that “almost every rule required some
improvement, if not a complete overhaul”). See generally id. at 444–74 (summarizing
significant revisions to the Model Rules that resulted from the Ethics 2000 process).
158. Id. at 469.
159. Id.
160. Kuckes, supra note 79, at 430. The deleted commentary reference pertained
to whether a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory information to the grand
jury, a controversy beyond the scope of this Article. Specifically, Model Rule 3.3(d)
requires lawyers in ex parte proceedings to disclose adverse facts to the tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2009). A comment to Rule 3.8
previously stated that this obligation applied to grand jury proceedings, and it was
this comment that was deleted by the Ethics 2000 Commission. Bruce A. Green,
Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1581; Love, supra note 155, at
449.
161. See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 79, at 429–31 & n.9 (describing how Rule 3.8 fails
to adequately address major ethical challenges facing prosecutors, characterizing the
Rule as “incomplete and vague,” and summarizing other criticisms of failure to
amend the rule).
162. Green, supra note 160, at 1581; see also id. at 1583 (“No ABA entity or major
organization representing prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers sought changes to
Rule 3.8.”).
163. See id. at 1583 (Green identifying himself as one of the handful of private
attorneys who raised concerns about the rule).
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the authors of Formal Opinion 09-454.164
How can the curious lack of interest in strengthening the rule
regarding prosecutors’ disclosure obligations be explained,
particularly now that the McDade Amendment had made state ethics
rules, which take their cue from the Model Rules, clearly and
unambiguously applicable to federal prosecutors? One possible
explanation is that proponents of more expansive disclosure did not
feel that the relatively open, transparent, and public revision process
of Ethics 2000165 was likely to achieve the desired result.166 For
whatever reason,167 proponents of more disclosure chose to sit out the
last major overhaul of the model ethics rules themselves, and Rule
3.8(d) remained unchanged.168
164. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 8
(2009) (identifying signatories, including Bruce A. Green).
165. Compare Love, supra note 155, at 443 (describing Ethics 2000 as involving
nearly a five year process, during which time the Commission was in regular
communication with its advisory council, reaching out to special interest groups,
posting its discussion drafts and meeting minutes on the Internet, and receiving
hundreds of comments, which would require fifty-one full day meetings that were
open to the public, as well as more than a dozen public hearings to sort out), with
infra Part III (delineating a widely held perception that in the normal course, ethics
rulemaking and rule-interpreting bodies, including the ABA, are dominated by one
side of the debate —the defense side—and lack the transparency and public
participation of Ethics 2000).
166. See Green, supra note 160, at 1586 (suggesting that “political” reasons explain
the Commission’s failure to amend Rule 3.8(d), and citing as an example a
consultant’s recommendation to the Commission that “to best ensure acceptance [of
amendments] among prosecutors, defense counsel and the courts, Rule 3.8 should
be reviewed comprehensively over a period of time with participation from the
ground up from all of the groups involved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
167. See Kuckes, supra note 79, at 437 (highlighting the lack of legislative history or
explanation for the Commission’s decision not to recommend changes to Rule 3.8 or
address prosecutorial ethics at all).
168. A new commission, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, is currently
working on revisions to the Model Rules to address “advances in technology and
global legal practice developments.” About Us—ABA Board of Governors/Commission on
Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last
visited Aug. 13, 2012). It does not appear that this Commission is considering
changes to Rule 3.8. See generally Summary of Ethics 20/20 Commission Actions—Items
Released for Comment by Ethics 20/20 Commission, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_
on_ethics_20_20/work_product.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2012) (identifying topics
the Commission has been working on as Inbound Foreign Lawyers, Technology,
Outsourcing, Uniformity/Choice of Law, Alternative Law Practice Structures, and
Alternative Litigation Financing). Separately, a different section of the ABA, the
Criminal Justice Section, is working on revisions to the ABA Criminal Standards for
Prosecution and Defense Functions (a guidance document that is separate from the
Model Rules, non-binding, and not intended to serve as the basis for professional
discipline). Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project To Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for
the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113–17 (2011). The
proposed draft provides that prosecutors should disclose all favorable information
(regardless of materiality) to the defense prior to trial; it does not, however, include
the “as soon as reasonably practical” language found in Formal Opinion 09-454. Id.

SCHIMPFF.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/27/2012 12:09 PM

1758

[Vol. 61:1729

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

In sum, none of the efforts at reforming a prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations had proven fully successful, and this history provides the
context in which Formal Opinion 09-454 was promulgated. As of
2009, efforts to expand the Brady line of cases and to curtail the
protections of the Jencks Act had long failed; the Ethics 2000 changes
to the Model Rules went into effect in 2002 with no change to Rule
3.8(d); proposed amendments to Rule 16 had been tabled in 2007
and interest in reviving the discussions had just barely gotten
underway; and the USAM had been amended in 2006, but the
changes were largely unsatisfactory to critics of DOJ’s disclosure
practices. The ABA Ethics Committee could not have been unaware
of all of this when it issued its decision in Formal Opinion 09-454.
III. THE ROLE OF ETHICS OPINIONS
A. The ABA Formal Ethics Opinion Process and Formal Opinion 09-454
Rulemaking bodies that promulgate ethics rules generally also
issue opinions that interpret those rules.169 For the ABA, that
function is carried out by its Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (which has been referred to in this Article
as the ABA Ethics Committee).170 The ABA Ethics Committee
periodically issues interpretations of provisions of the Model Rules
and its predecessors,171 which are published as “formal opinions.” 172
ABA ethics opinions do not have the force of law and are not binding
upon the states in interpreting their own ethics rules.173 Nevertheless,
they are generally regarded as being highly influential; they are
frequently cited by courts and relied upon by state ethics authorities
in construing their own versions of the rules.174
app. at 1147 (proposed draft of Standard 3-5.5(a) & (c)).
169. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 254 (1996) (“Both the ABA and most state bar associations
have established committees to render advisory opinions on the meaning of code
sections and the proscription of certain proposed actions.”).
170. For a brief history of the ABA Ethics Committee, see id. at 255 n.29.
171. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
172. AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS: RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES § 31.7 (2011) [hereinafter ABA CONSTITUTION], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates
/aba_constitution_and_bylaws.authcheckdam.pdf; Lawrence K. Hellman, When
“Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics
Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 324 n.22 (1997) (noting that the ABA Ethics
Committee may also provide “informal opinions” in response to ethics inquiries
from attorneys, but in practice no longer does so).
173. Hellman, supra note 172, at 326–29.
174. See id. at 328 (explaining that formal opinions are very influential and
frequently cited by a host of authorities, including state ethics authorities, which
frequently rely on the Committee’s construction of the rules because most states’

SCHIMPFF.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED-2 (DO NOT DELETE)

8/27/2012 12:09 PM

2012] ETHICS AND THE LAW ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE

1759

The ABA Ethics Committee operates with little openness or
transparency.175 There is no publicly available “legislative history” of
its opinions; the Committee does not publish its meeting minutes,
nor are there transcripts of its deliberations.176 The ABA Ethics
Committee may consider a particular issue and write an opinion
upon request from an individual lawyer or a state or local bar
association, or “on its own initiative.” 177 The opinions themselves do
not specify the origin of the issue.178 In the case of Formal Opinion
ethics rules are derived from ABA documents and, even where there are material
variations, the reasoning of an ABA opinion can be substantially persuasive and
command attention); see also Jorge L. Carro, The Ethics Opinions of the Bar: A Valuable
Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L. REV. 1, 17–20, 23, 35 (1992)
(concluding, after empirical study of both state bar association and ABA ethics
opinions, that “[i]n spite of their nonbinding character, the bar’s ethics opinions are
frequently referred to by the courts” and that “[t]he courts treat these opinions with
great deference and, in fact, attribute to them a degree of attention similar to that
usually found in the treatment of judicial opinions”); Ted Finman & Theodore
Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A
Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29
UCLA L. REV. 67, 82–83 (1981) (describing the influence of ABA ethics opinions);
Susan P. Koniak, Principled Opinions: A Response to Brickman, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 337,
348 (1996) (“[T]here are numerous court opinions that adopt the reasoning of ABA
ethics opinions as official law.”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
HARV. L. REV. 468, 501 n.146 (1990) (stating that ABA ethics opinions are by far “the
most important” advisory opinions). But see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 67 (1986) (“Bar ethics opinions have not played a large role in the discipline
of lawyers or in judicial rulings on such matters as the disqualification of a lawyer for
a conflict of interest. . . . Courts obviously do not feel bound to follow advice issued
by ethics committees, whose members are largely if not exclusively practicing
lawyers.”); Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 731–32, 742 (2002) (summarizing the literature criticizing bar
ethics opinions on the ground that they are largely ignored).
175. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT app. C, Rules of Procedure 5–6
(2009) (outlining procedures for the Committee’s deliberative process).
176. E-mail from Eileen B. Libby, Assoc. Ethics Counsel, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Barbara
Swatt Engstrom, Reference Librarian & Adjunct Professor, Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law
(June 22, 2011, 2:09 PST) [hereinafter Libby E-mail] (on file with Law Review). This
stands in contrast to the relatively open deliberations of the Ethics 2000 Commission,
constituted to consider and recommend changes to the Model Rules, see supra notes
155–60 and accompanying text, which conducted public meetings and published its
meeting minutes and comments received from the public. Libby E-mail, supra
(“Special groups that are constituted for a particular purpose, such as the Ethics
20/20 Commission or the Ethics 2000 Commission, publish minutes and transcripts
on the Center for [P]rofessional Responsibility’s website.”). The various Judicial
Conference Committees that considered amending Rule 16 likewise publish their
meeting minutes and reports online. See sources cited supra notes 122–144
(providing examples of publicly available meeting minutes and committee reports).
177. ABA CONSTITUTION, supra note 172, § 31.7.
178. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT app. C, Rules of Procedure 4 (2009)
(establishing that when a request is made, the Committee’s policy is that its
published opinions will not identify the requestor or the conduct that is the subject
of the opinion); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT app. C, Rules of Procedure
15 (establishing that the ABA will not voluntarily disclose information contained in
Committee files relating to requests for opinions that would disclose the identity of
the inquirer or the person whose conduct is the subject of the opinion without
consent). There have been occasions, however, when the Committee has publicly
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09-454, however, the ABA has confirmed that the Committee
undertook the matter at the suggestion of one of the Committee
members.179
In the Opinion, the ABA Ethics Committee set out to address what
was, in its view, a widely-held misperception that a prosecutor’s
disclosure obligations under Rule 3.8(d) were coextensive with her
obligations under the Brady line of cases.180 Thus, the Committee
decided to do what the Ethics 2000 Committee explicitly did not: to
explicate the relationship between Rule 3.8(d) and a prosecutor’s
constitutional obligations under Brady and its progeny.181 In so
doing, the Committee adopted several of the pro-defense viewpoints
that had been rejected both by the courts as well as during the
various reform processes outlined above.
The Committee first concluded that, unlike the constitutional
standard, Rule 3.8(d) contains no materiality limitation —that is, a
prosecutor must inform the accused of all known information
favorable to the defendant, even if the prosecutor does not believe
that the information would affect the outcome of the case at trial.182
The Committee further interpreted the rule to require that a
prosecutor consider not just defenses that the defendant intends to
raise, but also any other legally cognizable defenses that may exist
when determining whether evidence or information may be favorable
to the defendant.183 Finally, the Committee concluded that the rule
contains no de minimis threshold, meaning that a prosecutor must
disclose information even if “the prosecutor believes that the
information has only a minimal tendency to negate the defendant’s
guilt, or that the favorable evidence is highly unreliable.” 184

disclosed the identity of at least an institutional requestor. See Brickman, supra note
169, at 264 (discussing the news release accompanying Formal Opinion 94-389, in
which the Committee attributed the request for ethical guidance to the Manhattan
Institute).
179. See E-mail from Kathryn A. Thompson, ETHICSearch Counsel, Am. Bar
Ass’n, to Barbara Swatt Engstrom, Reference Librarian & Adjunct Professor, Seattle
Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 8, 2011 11:54 PST) (on file with Law Review).
180. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 3
(2009).
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin
McMunigal, ABA Explains Prosecutor’s Ethical Disclosure Duty, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2010,
at 41, 41 (noting that in interpreting Rule 3.8(d) in Formal Opinion 09-454, the ABA
Ethics Committee “addressed an issue that the Ethics 2000 Commission
sidestepped”).
182. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 4–5.
183. Id. at 5.
184. Id.
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Although the Committee’s interpretation of the scope of disclosure
under Rule 3.8(d) will no doubt provoke debate,185 more significant
for purposes of this Article is its interpretation of the timing
requirement. The Committee began with the general premise that
for the disclosure of information to be “timely” as required by Rule
3.8(d), it must be made early enough that the information can be
used effectively by the defense.186 This is all the prevailing case law
requires.187 The Committee then went a step further and reasoned
that “[b]ecause the defense can use favorable evidence and
information most fully and effectively the sooner it is received, such
evidence or information, once known to the prosecutor, must be
disclosed under Rule 3.8(d) as soon as reasonably practical.” 188 The
Committee did not further define what “as soon as reasonably
practical” means from the perspective of the prosecutor, and instead
focused on when favorable evidence would be useful to the
defense.189 The Committee thus concluded that the obligation of
timely disclosure requires that prosecutors disclose useful
information before the defense undertakes investigations, makes
decisions about affirmative defenses, or “determine[s] defense
strategy in general.” 190 In so doing, the ABA Ethics Committee
interpreted Rule 3.8(d) as conflicting with the Jencks Act, rather than
avoiding the conflict in the way that the Rule 16 committees sought
to do.191
In sum, Formal Opinion 09-454 eliminates the materiality
requirement (a requirement defense advocates have opposed in
court ever since Brady, and which they unsuccessfully tried to
persuade the Rule 16 committees to eliminate); pushes up the
timeline for disclosure in general (which defense advocates had also

185. See infra Part II.C, (suggesting that from the discussion surrounding possible
amendments to Rule 16, DOJ continues to believe that materiality should be the
touchstone of any disclosure requirement); see also, e.g., Breuer Letter, supra note
140, at 5–6, (setting forth DOJ’s argument in favor of retaining Rule 16’s materiality
requirement); McNulty Letter, supra note 75, at 16 (same).
186. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6.
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6.
189. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 181, at 42.
190. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6. The
one concrete example provided by the Committee is that a prosecutor must disclose
evidence and information covered by Rule 3.8(d) “prior to a guilty plea proceeding,
which may occur concurrently with the defendant’s arraignment.” Id. This example
is another way in which the Committee’s interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) departs from
what is required as a matter of due process. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
629 (2002) (holding that the Constitution does not require the government to
disclose impeachment information prior to a defendant pleading guilty).
191. See supra Part II.C.
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recently tried and failed to do with Rule 16); and adds, specifically, a
non-waivable requirement that all favorable information be disclosed
prior to a guilty plea (which the Supreme Court had rejected just
seven years prior).192
B. Criticism of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
The literature on bar association ethics opinions, including those
of the ABA, is largely critical.193 According to critics, ethics opinions
are, among other things, tainted by the actuality, or at least the
perception, of self-interest;194 they are of generally poor quality
substantively and are sources of confusion and inconsistency;195 they
192. Having done so, the ABA is now explicitly attempting to leverage the
Opinion to drive changes to the substantive law. The ABA House of Delegates in
August 2011 adopted a Resolution urging all federal, state, territorial, and tribal
governments to, in essence, codify Formal Opinion 09-454. See AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 105D, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/files_flutter/13105754842011_hod_
annual_meeting_summary_of_resolutions.authcheckdam.pdf. The Resolution calls
on all governments to adopt disclosure rules, by statute or judicial rulemaking,
requiring the prosecution to disclose all favorable information, without regard to
materiality, prior to trial or a guilty plea. Id. at 1, 2, 14–15. The Report
accompanying the Resolution argues that prosecutors are already ethically bound to
do so —citing Formal Opinion 09-454 as support for its broad interpretation of the
ethical rule —so, therefore, “there is no rational reason that prosecutors should not
be legally bound as well.” Id. at 10, 13.
193. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal Ethics Opinions,
22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 973, 985–86, 1004–05 (1997) (questioning the utility of state
regimes that produce non-authoritative ethics opinions, and advocating adoption of
systems where the process is controlled by state supreme courts and resulting
opinions are binding, at least for disciplinary purposes); Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics
Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 313, 349–62 (2002) (summarizing critiques of ABA ethics opinions,
which include contentions that they are of poor quality with little reasoning or
analysis, often delayed, and lacking a review process). For a defense of the activities
of the ABA and other bar association ethics committees, see generally Green, supra
note 174, arguing that bar committee ethics opinions are undervalued and not
inherently flawed; Koniak, supra note 174, at 348, pointing out that courts often
adopt the reasoning of ABA ethics opinions as law, which indicates that such
opinions are persuasive; and Richard H. Underwood, Confessions of an Ethics
Chairman, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 125 (1991), summarizing critiques of ethics opinions and
arguing that they are based on misunderstanding and exaggeration.
194. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 169, at 250 (critiquing the Committee’s process
for being self-regulating and blatantly self-serving of lawyers’ interests); Joy, supra
note 193, at 354–58 (summarizing anecdotal evidence supporting self-interest
critique, and noting the lack of procedural safeguards against self-interest affecting
the ethics opinion process); Trager, supra note 18, at 1130–31 (concluding based on
experiences with state bar ethics committees that in too many instances, the
interpretation of ethics rules is guided by professional interests and not the public
interest).
195. See genereally Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association
Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 67 (1981) (summarizing an
examination of ABA ethics opinions, and noting pervasive, serious flaws in
reasoning); Hellman, supra note 172 (explaining how the applicability of ABA
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issue from bodies that serve a dual legislative and interpretive
function, which invites role confusion;196 and they, like the rules they
interpret, are subject to tactical use (or misuse) by opponents in
litigation.197 Several of these criticisms seem particularly apt as
applied to Formal Opinion 09-454, which underscores the problem
with effecting this sort of policy change via an ethics opinion,
especially when proponents of the change have previously tried and
failed through more conventional and appropriate means to
accomplish their goal.
1.

Self-Interest
Bar association ethics opinions have been criticized on the ground
that they are influenced by the association’s members’ self-interest.
As Professor Lester Brickman has noted, professional organizations
exist to advance the interests of their members; this is especially true
of organizations, such as the ABA, which seek to maintain selfregulatory status.198 And because the ethics committees that issue
opinions are integral parts of the associations themselves, the
implication is that the committees are likewise working to advance, or
cannot help but be influenced by, the interests of the associations’
members.199 Some commentators have focused on the composition
of the ethics committees themselves—specifically, the predominance
of civil practitioners, criminal defense lawyers, and “elite” lawyers—
as a source of actual or perceived bias.200
The result is that, as Professor Bruce Green observed, “[b]ar
opinions is often questionable and frequently creates uncertainty among lawyers).
196. See, e.g., Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 145 (arguing that combining
legislative and interpretive functions in the Committee blurs the distinction between
the separate responsibilities); Hellman, supra note 172, at 362–63 (positing that
strained opinions arise out of the Committee impatiently intervening in issues that
should have been handled legislatively by the House of Delegates).
197. See, e.g., Trager, supra note 18, at 1161 (describing how the defense bar made
tactical use of the “no contact” rule as an example of one side’s strategic use of an
ethics rule —and ethics committees’ interpretations of that rule—in litigation).
198. Brickman, supra note 169, at 250.
199. See id. at 255–56 (noting that the Ethics Committee has previously “been
responsive to the financial interests of lawyers when those interests were threatened
by ethical concerns”); see also Joy, supra note 193, at 355–56 (explaining ways in
which membership interests could influence or be perceived to influence ethics
opinions).
200. See, e.g., Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 150–55 (considering the ABA
Ethics Committee’s composition, consisting exclusively of lawyers, and nearly all of
whom are from the “most prestigious level of the profession,” as potentially
problematic, but concluding that it is unclear whether mandating changes in
composition would be likely to improve quality of opinions); Trager, supra note 18, at
1159 (noting that most bar association ethics committees are heavily weighted with
civil practitioners and have far more representation from the defense side in
criminal practice).
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association rules are perceived to privilege the interests of lawyers
over non-lawyers, of private lawyers and their clients over the
government, and of corporate law firms and their clients over small
Although
firms, solo practitioners, and individual clients.” 201
Professor Green was writing specifically of bar association ethics rules
as opposed to the opinions interpreting those rules, the same
observations should apply with equal force to the latter, given that the
ethics committees writing the opinions are part of the larger
organizations, and particularly given that, as discussed below, those
same committees are often responsible for drafting and suggesting
changes to the rules themselves.202
As Professor Peter Joy has noted, the self-interest critique of bar
association ethics opinions relies largely on anecdotal evidence and
has not been proven empirically.203 Nevertheless, just the perception
that ethics opinions may be influenced by, or slanted more heavily in
favor of, the interests of certain segments of the bar is deeply
problematic for the perceived legitimacy of ethics opinions.204
Certainly, there is a perception among prosecutors, and various other
observers, that the bar associations are dominated by criminal
defense lawyers, and that the resulting ethics rules and
interpretations are shaped by that influence.205
201. Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in
Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 518–19
(1996) (footnotes omitted).
202. See infra Part III.B.3; see also Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 145 (“In
addition to its interpretive duties, [the Committee] also recommends ‘appropriate
amendments to or clarifications of the Code’ to the ABA House of Delegates.”
(footnote omitted)).
203. Joy, supra note 193, at 356.
204. See Green, supra note 201, at 518 (asserting that when ethics rules appear to
be fairer, they command more respect from the lawyers to whom they apply).
205. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 15, at 770 (arguing that the structure of the ABA
and the process by which the organization adopts rules of professional conduct
“makes a mockery of any claim that these rules represent a consensus among the
regulated population,” and that the Model Rules related specifically to criminal
practice are a clear instance in which one side, the defense, has dominated the rulemaking process); Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Code To
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. LAW REV. 923, 966 (1996)
(noting that “[t]he prevailing prosecutorial perspective is that the ABA often adopts
rules that create ‘a litigation advantage’”); Trager, supra note 18, at 1159–60 (noting
that most bar association ethics committees are heavily weighted with civil
practitioners who “at best, may have little knowledge of the concerns and needs of
law enforcement,” and have far more representation from the defense side in
criminal practice, whose members “may take a less than disinterested stance” on
ethical rules related to criminal practice); Zacharias, supra note 15, at 451 (“The
ABA traditionally has emphasized the importance of safeguarding the relationship
between criminal defendants and counsel, for both systemic reasons and to protect
the financial interests of the bar.”); id. at 457–58 (“Inevitably, the DOJ (the
prosecution’s regulatory representative) and the ABA (the defense bar’s regulatory
representative) will emphasize personal concerns of its constituents, to the detriment
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The reaction to Formal Opinion 09-454 will no doubt be clouded
by that perception. While the ABA’s first stated goal is to “Serve Our
Members,” by “[p]rovid[ing] benefits, programs and services which
promote members’ professional growth and quality of life,” 206 the vast
majority of its members are not prosecutors; rather, they are
predominantly civil practitioners and criminal defense lawyers.207
The ABA Ethics Committee is drawn from this membership.208
Committee members are appointed by the president of the ABA for
three-year terms and may be reappointed for successive terms.209
Thus, the Committee members are accountable only to the ABA
president who, in turn, is accountable only to the ABA
membership.210
of other regulatory functions.”); id. at 459 (describing two instances in which DOJ
objected to ethics rules adopted by the ABA, but was “outnumbered by the defense
bar,” and “[i]n essence . . . had no way of influencing the outcome”); Note, supra
note 16, at 2089 n.76 (“A . . . fundamental question is whether the state bar
associations that adopt ethics rules ever seriously consider prosecutors’ interests. As
prosecutors have noted, at the level of the rulemaking committees . . . there is no
one who is representing the prosecutorial point of view.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Again, while several of these commentators were speaking of the rule
adoption process rather than the rule interpretation process, the rule interpretation
process cannot help but be painted with the same brush when the committees
issuing ethics opinions are situated within the larger organizations and when, as with
the ABA, the same committees are responsible for both recommending changes to
the rules and interpreting the rules. See infra Part III.B.3.
206. ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/
about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited July 15, 2012) (Goal I). Its other
stated goals are to improve the profession (Goal II), to eliminate bias and enhance
diversity (Goal III), and to advance the rule of law (Goal IV). Id.
207. See Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1285 n.197 (2001) (calculating that less than one percent of
the ABA’s members are prosecutors). The ABA does not itself release statistical data
on its membership. See E-mail from Annette Cade, Reference Librarian, Am. Bar
Ass’n, to author (July 31, 2012, 7:54 PST) (on file with Law Review) (confirming ABA
policy of non-disclosure of membership statistical data, and declining request for
current membership statistics by practice area on that basis).
Anecdotally, federal prosecutors as a group do seem to be less involved in bar
associations than many other groups of lawyers. This phenomenon may stem partly
from the fact that federal prosecutors need only be an active member of one state’s
bar, and it need not be the state in which they perform their work on behalf of the
federal government, leaving many with little connection with their licensing bar
beyond paying their yearly dues. It may also be that with good job security and no
need to attract clients, they see less need to engage in the “networking” opportunity
that being active in a bar association provides. Finally, unlike many attorneys in
private practice who have their bar association dues reimbursed by their employer,
government attorneys must pay their own professional association dues. But it is a
fair question why, if they feel underrepresented in the ABA and state bar
associations, they do not get more involved.
208. ABA CONSTITUTION, supra note 172, § 31.3 (establishing that membership of
Standing Committees is comprised of members of the Association).
209. Id. § 31.3.
210. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 148 (explaining how Committee
members are accountable to no one other than the ABA president); see also ABA
CONSTITUTION, supra note 172, § 8.2(a) (providing details on the president’s election
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Although the Committee that authored Formal Opinion 09-454
included a former federal prosecutor,211 it is hard to escape the
appearance that the Opinion serves the interests of those that are
more heavily represented within the ABA.
The Opinion is
substantively pro-defense, broadening the scope of the current law
and, in terms of the timing requirement, it clearly benefits not just
criminal defendants, but also criminal defense lawyers themselves. As
a general matter, earlier disclosure benefits criminal defendants for
the reasons identified by the Committee in its Opinion,212 although
the extent to which they are benefitted will vary widely depending on
the circumstances. Still, it cannot be doubted that earlier disclosure
is more convenient for defense attorneys in terms of managing their
work and trial preparation schedules. It is difficult to know whether
the views of individual Committee members were affected by their
own experiences or internal pressure from ABA members, and it
certainly is not the intent of this Article to question the integrity of
any of the individuals who give their time to serve in this capacity. But
regardless, there is an issue of the perceived legitimacy of ABA ethics
opinions to the extent that such influences appear to be operating.
2.

Quality and uncertainty
Another major criticism of bar association ethics opinions is that
they are of poor quality substantively, meaning that they often reach
an “incorrect” conclusion or are poorly reasoned,213 and that while
their purpose is to lend clarity, they frequently become sources of
confusion and inconsistency.214 The pioneering critics of the quality
by the ABA House of Delegates).
211. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 8
(2009) (identifying signatories, including Bruce A. Green). Professor Bruce Green
was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York in the
mid-1980s. See Faculty Profile for Bruce Green, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/1100.htm (last visited July 15, 2012). Professor
Green is also, however, a frequent critic of prosecutorial ethics, and one of the few
who called for Rule 3.8 to be amended during Ethics 2000. See, e.g, Green, supra note
149; Green supra note 160.
212. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6
(positing that information disclosed early by prosecutors may assist defense counsel
in conducting defense investigations, evaluating defense strategies, and determining
applicable affirmative defenses and pleas).
213. See, e.g., Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 104 (finding only twenty-one
out of forty-eight Ethics Committee holdings to be “correct,” and of these, only
seven to be “influential”(meaning likely to affect the behavior of the lawyers and
code enforcers who consult them)); Hellman, supra note 172, at 334–35 (describing
how the ABA Ethics Committee interprets the rules according to what they believe
the rules should mean or were intended to mean as opposed to employing any
accepted method of statutory construction).
214. See Hellman, supra note 172, at 317, 332 (noting the uncertain effect of
subsequent ABA ethics opinions on state law adoptions of ABA guidelines).
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of ABA ethics opinions are Professors Ted Finman and Theodore
Schneyer, who undertook a comprehensive review of a decade’s
worth of ABA formal opinions in 1981.215 The professors concluded
that as a body of work, the opinions are “seriously flawed, so much so
that their overall influence may well be unfortunate.” 216
More recently, Professor Lawrence Hellman evaluated several
formal opinions and concluded that the ABA Ethics Committee
continues to issue “strained” opinions that “flout the language of the
rules they purport to interpret.” 217
Specifically, “rather than
engaging in a straightforward exercise of interpretation according to
accepted canons of statutory construction,” some opinions “set forth
the Committee’s view of what the rules should say or were meant to
say.” 218 Professor Hellman notes that ABA opinions have the
potential to be sources of uncertainty and inconsistency because first,
while most states’ ethics rules are based on the ABA’s Model Rules or
Model Code, the versions adopted by the states may differ either
slightly or materially, and second, because the states may or may not
adopt the ABA’s interpretation even of rules that they adopted
verbatim from the ABA models.219 Thus, every issuance of a new ABA
formal opinion leaves lawyers with the unavoidable question of
whether or not to follow the opinion, due to uncertainty as to
whether it will be followed in their particular jurisdiction.220
Professor Hellman concludes that by continuing to issue strained
interpretations of the rules, the ABA Ethics Committee will, over
time, undercut the legitimacy of the ethics rules as binding
constraints on the practice of law.221
A full critique of the quality and “correctness” of Formal Opinion
09-454 is beyond the scope of this Article. What does bear
examining, however, is the potential applicability of Professor
Hellman’s argument that the Committee writes opinions about what

215. Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195. Specifically, Professors Finman and
Schneyer evaluated twenty-one formal opinions based upon their holdings (judged
by both the correctness or incorrectness of the holdings and their likely influence)
and their reasoning (judged by identification of a tenable rationale, identification of
relevant authority, identification of problems of interpretive choice, careful analysis
of problems of choice, and clarity). Id. at 92–144.
216. Id. at 72.
217. Hellman, supra note 172, at 317.
218. Id. at 334.
219. Id. at 326–29.
220. Id. at 332.
221. Id. at 317; see also id. at 335 (fearing that lawyers will begin to view the rules of
legal ethics as malleable tools for adversarial argumentation rather than as standards
of good faith compliance due to uncertainty over the proper interpretation).
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the rules should say or were meant to say.222 As previously discussed,
during the Ethics 2000 process, the full ABA explicitly did not amend
Rule 3.8(d) in a manner that would explicate the relationship
between the ethics rule and the Brady doctrine.223 Yet that is what the
ABA Ethics Committee explicitly set out to do when, on its own
initiative, it authored the Opinion.224 More specifically, the ABA
could have amended the language of Rule 3.8(d) to say what the
Committee now says it means: that a prosecutor must disclose any
information favorable to the defense, whether exculpatory or
impeachment, and regardless of whether it is contained in a witness
statement, as soon as reasonably practical upon learning of the
information. Instead, the ABA chose to have the Rule continue to
require nothing more than “timely” disclosure. 225
Neither the text of the Rule nor the Comment to the Rule explains
what is meant by “timely.” A fair reading of Rule 3.8(d) might
interpret “timely” consistent with the standard used in the relevant,
well-established legal precedent, the Brady line of cases, i.e.,
disclosure at a time sufficient to allow the defense to use the
information effectively at trial. On the other hand, the Committee’s
contention that “timely” as used in the Rule means “as soon as
reasonably practical” (which seems to suggest doing something as
soon as it can be accomplished),226 is contrary to the common
understanding of the word “timely,” and is also at odds with the
distinction made throughout the Model Rules themselves between
actions that are required to be accomplished “timely” and those that
are required to be accomplished “promptly.” 227
222. Id. at 334.
223. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text (noting that during the
Ethics 2000 overhaul of the ABA Model Rules, no substantive changes were made to
Rule 3.8(d)).
226. Admittedly, beyond reference to the specific scenarios cited in Formal
Opinion 09-454 (all of which are framed from the defense perspective), see supra
notes 189–190 and accompanying text, it is unclear exactly what the Committee
means by “as soon as reasonably practical.” Part of the difficulty is that none of the
standard dictionary definitions of “practical” seems particularly apt. Indeed,
“practicable,” which the explanatory note preceding the Opinion for some reason
uses (whereas the body of the Opinion itself uses “practical”), compare ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 1 (2009), with id. at 6, may
have been the word the Committee was actually searching for. “Practicable” means
“capable of being done, effected, or put into practice; feasible.” AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1377 (3th ed. 2000). Presumably, therefore,
what the Committee intends is that disclosure must be made right away, or as soon as
the logistics or practicalities of gathering, copying, and sending or making the
evidence available for inspection can be accomplished.
227. DOJ successfully advanced this argument in resisting the application of
Formal Opinion 09-454 to a discovery dispute in United States v. Colacurcio. See infra
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A standard dictionary definition of “timely” is “[o]ccurring at a
suitable or opportune time; well-timed.” 228 This definition necessarily
implies that the determination of whether a disclosure is “timely”
must be made by reference to criteria outside of the Rule itself (such
as, for example, other laws or rules governing prosecutors’ disclosure
obligations).229 On the other hand, “promptly,” which is used
elsewhere in the Model Rules, including in other subsections of Rule
3.8 itself,230 is defined as “[c]arried out or performed without
delay.” 231 Had the drafters of Rule 3.8(d) intended to require
disclosure of favorable information as soon as reasonably practical
once the information is known, it seems reasonable that they would
have used the more apt “promptly.” 232
notes 251–259 and accompanying text; see also In re Auerhahn, MBD No. 09-10206RWZ-WGY-GAO, 2011 WL 4352350, at *14–15 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2011) (per curiam)
(drawing a distinction between “timely” disclosure as used in disciplinary rule and
“disclosure at the earliest feasible opportunity” as used in precatory prosecution
function standard, and declining to discipline a federal prosecutor who made a
“timely” disclosure as judged by prevailing legal standards although he clearly could
have disclosed earlier and thus failed to disclose at the earliest feasible opportunity).
228. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 226, at
1810; see also 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 111 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “timely” as
“at the right or a fortunate time”).
229. See, e.g., Auerhahn, 2011 WL 4352350, at *15 (referring to Jencks Act and First
Circuit law on disclosure of exculpatory evidence to determine timeliness of
disclosure under predecessor to Rule 3.8(d)); United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR09209RAJ, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2010) ECF No. 222 (order denying motion
to compel production of favorable information) (referring to Jencks Act to
determine timeliness of disclosure under Rule 3.8(d)).
230. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2009) (requiring prompt
disclosure to the court and the defendant of new, credible, and material evidence
that demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not
commit the charged offense).
231. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 226, at
1403; see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 228, at 620 (defining
“promptly” as “quickly” and “without a moment’s delay”).
232. Given the many instances in which the Model Rules contain the word
“promptly,” it stands to reason that when the term “timely” occurs in a Model Rule,
it is intended to convey a different meaning. Indeed, the terms appear to be used in
the Model Rules in a manner consistent with their dictionary definitions.
For example, “timely” is used in Model Rules 1.0(k), 1.10(a)(2)(i), 1.11(b)(1),
1.12(c)(1), and 1.18(d)(2)(i), all in provisions relating to the screening of
disqualified lawyers, indicating that screening must be initiated at the appropriate or
suitable time in order to be effective. Model Rule 1.13(c)(1) permits a lawyer to
reveal confidential information relating to the representation of an organization in
certain circumstances where the highest authority of the organization has failed to
address the matter of concern “in a timely and appropriate manner.” In each of
these provisions, the use of the term “timely” conveys that the action in question
should occur at the appropriate time or after the appropriate interval, with
appropriateness determined, at least in part, by fact-driven considerations external to
the Rule.
On the other hand, for example, Model Rule 1.4(a)(1) (“Communication”)
requires a lawyer to “promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent” is required, and Model Rule
1.4(a)(4) requires a lawyer to “promptly comply with reasonable requests for
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3.

Dual functions of ABA Ethics Committee
The ABA Ethics Committee has dual authority both to render
opinions interpreting the existing rules and to propose
“amendments to, or clarifications of” those rules.233 Professors
Finman and Schneyer first postulated the potential for role confusion
inherent in this combination of responsibilities as a possible
explanation for the poor quality of the Committee’s formal
opinions.234 Specifically, Finman and Schneyer hypothesized that one
entity controlling both legislative and interpretative functions could
cause that entity to use its opinions as a vehicle for changing the
rules.235 Moreover, because “the amendment process is more
cumbersome and has less predictable results than writing an opinion,
the Committee has some incentive to exceed the proper limits of
interpretation in its opinions.” 236 Ultimately, Finman and Schneyer
found insufficient evidence to support their hypothesis that role
confusion was a contributing factor to the poor substantive reasoning
of ABA ethics opinions, and thus concluded that the Committee’s
dual authority likely was not the predominant cause of the perceived
deficiencies in its interpretive opinions.237
Professor Hellman revisited the question fifteen years later,
however, and reached the opposite conclusion.
In Professor
Hellman’s view, Professors Finman and Schneyer’s hypothesis could
explain the strained results reached by the ABA Ethics Committee in
each of the opinions he examined.238 Hellman found that in each
instance where the Committee was struggling with an issue that was
naturally suited for a legislative solution through the ABA House of
information.” Model Rule 4.4(b) (“Respect for Rights of Third Persons”) requires a
lawyer who has received a document inadvertently sent to promptly notify the
sender. In each of these Rules, the use of “promptly” seems clearly intended to
require the action at issue to be accomplished without delay.
Some Rules, including Rule 3.8, see supra note 230, use both “timely” and
“promptly.” For example, both terms occur in Model Rules 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12,
regarding the disqualification of lawyers. These provisions require that the
disqualified lawyer be “timely” screened from participation in a prohibited matter,
suggesting that the screening must be done at a time when it will be effective, but
that written notice of the lawyer’s disqualification be made “promptly,” conveying
that notice should be given without delay.
233. ABA CONSTITUTION, supra note 172, § 31.7.
234. Finman & Schneyer, supra note 195, at 145.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 146 (noting that they could find “no firm evidence that role
confusion had anything to do with [the Committee’s] lawlessness,” and thus
concluding that the dangers associated with the combination of legislative and
interpretive functions were “too insubstantial to explain much of the inadequacy” in
the opinions they examined).
238. Hellman, supra note 172, at 363.
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Delegates, rather than lobbying for a legislative solution, the
Committee plunged ahead and sought to implement its desired
change by writing an ethics opinion.239
The historical context, along with the Committee’s strained
interpretation of “timely,” lends credence to Professors Finman and
Schneyer’s original hypothesis as an explanation for Formal Opinion
09-454. Even more telling is that, unlike the situations observed by
Professor Hellman, in which “House of Delegates action was either
forthcoming or easily obtainable,” 240 no such possibility existed here.
A requirement that prosecutors make earlier disclosures of more
information was neither forthcoming nor easily obtainable —through
the ABA House of Delegates or other venues—as demonstrated by
the history of failed attempts to achieve earlier and broader
disclosure obligations described in Part II. Not only did the ABA
House of Delegates fail to amend Rule 3.8(d) during Ethics 2000,241
but the Rule 16 amendment process had also stalled at the time the
opinion was issued.242 All of this explains why the ABA Ethics
Committee, when it decided on its own initiative to issue a formal
opinion interpreting Rule 3.8(d), may be viewed as improperly using
the opinion process as an expedient vehicle for changing a rule (and,
through application, a related body of law) that could not otherwise
be changed.
4.

Use as a tactical weapon
The ABA has asserted that its ethics rules are not to be used as
tactical weapons in litigation.243 Nevertheless, the Model Rules, and
the ethics opinions interpreting those rules, are sometimes used in
this manner. The potential for abuse in the courtroom renders the
opinion-writing process not merely an academic exercise, but rather a
vehicle for implementing otherwise controversial policy changes that
can have real-world consequences.
Indeed, this tactical deployment is already beginning to occur in
the wake of Formal Opinion 09-454. Irwin Schwartz, a Seattle
criminal defense attorney and past president of NACDL, published
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 155–161 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part II.C.
243. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope (2009) (“[T]he purpose of the
Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not
imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to
seek enforcement of the Rule.”).
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an article urging defense lawyers to use Rule 3.8(d) as a “tool” to
“secure discovery of exculpatory and mitigating information.” 244 The
Opinion, which Schwartz calls a “powerful means to assure fairness in
criminal proceedings,” 245 features prominently in his proposed threepart strategy. First, Schwartz recommends that defense attorneys
argue that the ethics rule is broader than the Brady doctrine and
requires an earlier and broader disclosure of information to the
defense.246 Second, defense attorneys should argue that the courts
have a statutory and ethical obligation to require prosecutors to
comply with Rule 3.8(d).247 Third, the argument goes, the Jencks Act
no longer permits the government to delay production of Brady
material within witness statements until disclosure is due under the
Act and Rule 26.2—i.e., after direct examination of the witness.248
According to Schwartz, now that Formal Opinion 09-454 has declared
that disclosure must be made “as soon as reasonably practical,” 249
Rule 3.8(d) requires a result different from what is currently the
accepted law in those jurisdictions where the Jencks Act trumps Brady
in terms of the timing of disclosure.250
Around the time the article was published, Schwartz was putting his
theory into practice as counsel for strip-club magnate and reputed
organized crime figure Frank Colacurcio, Sr. The late Colacurcio Sr.
was being prosecuted, along with his son and several associates, for
conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act251 (RICO) by allegedly encouraging or permitting
prostitution at their clubs.252 The prosecution agreed to produce
244. Irwin H. Schwartz, Beyond Brady: Using Model Rule 3.8(d) in Federal Court for
Discovery of Exculpatory Information, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 35, 35; see also Norman L.
Reimer, Federal Discovery Reform: DOJ’s Baby Steps Are Inadequate, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010,
at 7, 7 (arguing that DOJ’s new policy pronouncements are unlikely to produce
tangible change, and that “the defense bar should look beyond the narrow contours
of Brady and pursue the ethics route to obtain discovery”).
245. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 35.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 36. The Schwartz article actually uses the word “practicable,” but the
confusion is understandable. See supra note 226 (discussing the ABA Ethics
Committee’s use of both “practical” and “practicable” in Formal Opinion 09-454).
250. See Schwartz, supra note 244, at 34–35 (arguing that if a jurisdiction has
codified Rule 3.8(d) then that should allow disclosure of information even if the
Jencks Act trumps Brady in that jurisdiction); see also supra notes 47–50 and
accompanying text (discussing various jurisdictions’ decisions on whether the Jencks
Act trumps Brady).
251. Pub. L. No 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006)).
252. United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR09-209RAJ, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
9, 2010) ECF No. 222 (order denying motion to compel production of favorable
information); see Ian Ith & Lewis Kamb, Strip-Club Magnate Indicted, SEATTLE TIMES,
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Jencks Act witness statements eight weeks prior to trial,253 but
declined the defendants’ request to turn over the statements— or the
“favorable information” some of them contained—any sooner, citing
the potential for witness tampering or intimidation where many of its
witnesses were dancers employed at the defendants’ clubs.254 The
defendants moved to compel earlier disclosure, essentially making
the same arguments outlined in the Schwartz article.255 The court
rejected the defendants’ arguments and declined to order earlier
production of the witness statements or any favorable information
contained therein.256 The court held that the Citizens Protection Act
and Rule 3.8(d) did not impliedly repeal the Jencks Act and that, in
any event, there was no conflict between the two because the Jencks
Act’s requirement that witness statements be disclosed after direct
examination satisfied Rule 3.8(d)’s requirement of “timely”
disclosure.257 Thus, the court expressly declined to rely on Formal
Opinion 09-454.258 The court recognized that “[w]here binding
authority is silent as to a particular ethics issue, courts can consider
ABA [ethics] opinions as persuasive authority,” but noted that within
the Ninth Circuit, the Jencks Act overrides Brady and, thus, binding
Ninth Circuit authority strongly suggests that the Jencks Act
determines the timeliness of disclosing witness statements.259
Defendants in other cases have similarly tried to use the as a
procedural weapon to compel earlier disclosure,260 seemingly with
little success thus far.261

July 1, 2009, at A1 (listing the charges against Colacurio Sr.).
253. Colacurcio, No. CR09-209RAJ, slip op. at 3.
254. Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of
Favorable Information, supra note 89, at 6–7.
255. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Favorable Information at 5–11,
United States v. Colacurcio, No. CR09-209RAJ (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No.
157.
256. Colacurcio, No. CR09-209RAJ, slip op. at 11.
257. Id. at 6–7.
258. Id. at 7 (holding that “the ABA Opinion’s interpretation of ‘timely’ in Model
Rule 3.8(d) does not govern the interpretation” of Washington state’s version of the
Rule).
259. Id. at 8.
260. See, e.g., Defendant Stephanie Prickett’s Motion to Compel at 3, 8, United
States v. Prickett, No. 1:10-CR-211-RJJ (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2010), ECF No. 60
(arguing for production of Brady, Giglio, and Jencks Act material based on Formal
Opinion 09-454 immediately rather than “at the time of trial”); Reply to United
States’ Response to Defendants’ Joint Motion to Compel Discovery, Identify
Witnesses and Memorandum in Support at 2–3, United States v. Padilla, No. 1:09-CR3598-JB (D.N.M. July 26, 2010), ECF No. 54 (using Model Rule 3.8(d) and Formal
Opinion 09-454 in support of motion to compel earlier disclosure of material the
prosecution contends is subject to the Jencks Act timetable); Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant Eldridge’s Non-Dispositive Motions at 19, 28–30, United States
v. Eldridge, No. 1:09-CR-329-RJA-HBS (W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2010), ECF No. 44
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IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

It remains to be seen how broadly Formal Opinion 09-454’s
interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) will be adopted by state disciplinary
authorities, or how successful criminal defense attorneys will be in
implementing their new “beyond Brady” strategy using the Opinion
as part of their tactical arsenal, but the situation as it stands now is
untenable. Prosecutors face uncertainty as to how to proceed in the
face of the conflict between the Jencks Act and the Opinion’s
interpretation of the timing requirement embodied in their ethical
obligation, with at least the threat of disciplinary sanctions.
(advocating for, among other things, “early disclosure of Jencks Act material” in a
motion supported by Model Rule 3.8(d) and Formal Opinion 09-454); cf. Brief in
Support of the Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland by
Defendants Nagle and Fink at 11, United States v. Nagle, No. 1:09-CR-384-SHR (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 4, 2010), ECF No. 44 (relying in part on Pennsylvania Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.8(d) in seeking to compel immediate disclosure of information the
prosecution did not intend to disclose until date in court’s scheduling order for
disclosure of Giglio material).
Some defendants have even cited the Schwartz article directly. See, e.g., Motion for
Discovery with Accompanying Citation of Authority at 3 n.1, 10–11 United States v.
Piper, No. 1:09-CR-218-JHS (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2010), ECF No. 37 (citing the Schwartz
article when asserting that neither the Jencks Act nor Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which otherwise allows for the late disclosure of information,
trump the ethical obligations of the prosecutor under Rule 3.8(d)). Others have
used the phrase “beyond Brady,” an apparent reference to the title of the Schwartz
article. See, e.g., Motion for Discovery at 10, United States v. Korbe, No. 2:09-CR-5TFM (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2010), ECF No. 94 (referencing the “new” Model Rule
3.8(d) as another justification for “the [defendant’s] ‘beyond Brady’ discovery
request,” and asserting that, in light of Formal Opinion 09-454, Rule 3.8(d) “now
requires” prosecutors to inform defendants of all known information favorable to
the accused “as soon as reasonably practicable”).
261. In Nagle, it appears that the court granted the defendant’s motion, at least in
part, but it is unclear from the court’s order, which refers to specific pages and
paragraphs of documents filed under seal, see United States v. Nagle, No. 09-CR-384SHR, slip op. at 2–3 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2010), ECF No. 65, exactly what the
government was required to produce. In the other cases mentioned above, it
appears that the courts either denied or did not rule specifically on the defense
motions. In Korbe, the court specifically denied the defendant’s request for a
“beyond-Brady” discovery order, United States v. Korbe, No. 09-CR-5-TFM, slip op. at
15 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2010), ECF No. 205, or for disclosure that goes beyond what is
required under Brady/Giglio, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
Jencks Act, id. at 11. The court also acknowledged that it could not compel the
government to produce Jencks Act material prior to trial, although the government
agreed in that case to produce such material seven days prior to trial. See id. at 8–9.
The court appears, however, to have ordered the government to produce any “Brady
impeachment-type material” in its witness files fourteen days, rather than seven days,
prior to trial. See id. at 5–6. Although the defendants may have succeeded in part in
getting earlier discovery in these two cases, both Nagle and Korbe were decided by
district courts within the Third Circuit, in which the Court of Appeals has
determined that Brady must take precedence over the Jencks Act on the question of
timing. See supra note 50. Research has not identified any court order in a Jenckstrumps-Brady jurisdiction in which a court has ordered early disclosure of Jencks Act
statements or favorable information contained therein in reliance on either Rule
3.8(d) or Formal Opinion 09-454.
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Meanwhile, the “appearance problem” created by the Opinion’s
incorporation of a defense-side wish list of changes to the law that
had been repeatedly pressed, unsuccessfully, in other fora, threatens
to undermine respect for the ethics rules and the ABA Ethics
Committee’s interpretation of those rules.
This Article does not purport to have a complete answer to the
many difficult questions raised by the events outlined herein and the
situation as it now stands. It does, however, hope to advance the
conversation about them by offering the following observations and
suggestions for moving beyond the current impasse.
First, nowhere in the Opinion does the ABA Ethics Committee
acknowledge the conflict it creates with the Jencks Act, nor does it
mention the Jencks Act at all.262 If the ABA Ethics Committee did not
mean for its interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) to apply to federal
prosecutors, which seems unlikely, or if it meant for Rule 3.8(d) to be
read consistently with the Jencks Act in federal jurisdictions where
the Jencks Act trumps the Brady doctrine on the question of timing,
then it should clarify its Opinion.263
Second, assuming the ABA Ethics Committee did intend for its
Opinion to fully cover situations arising in federal prosecutions in
which Brady information is contained within witness statements, the
Opinion should be rejected by courts and state ethics bodies because
it is in direct conflict with binding federal law —i.e., the Jencks Act.264
262. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009)
(omitting any mentioning of the Jencks Act in the body of the Opinion).
263. The Opinion does contain the following boilerplate disclaimer: “This
opinion is based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the
ABA House of Delegates through August 2009. The laws, court rules, regulations,
rules of professional conduct, and opinions promulgated in individual jurisdictions
are controlling.” Id. at 1 n.1. It is doubtful the Committee meant by this generic
disclaimer, which appears on all of its opinions, that the Jencks Act takes precedence
over its interpretation of a prosecutor’s ethical obligation with respect to the timing
of disclosure. And, clearly, this perfunctory language has not discouraged defense
attorneys from reading the Opinion as contradicting the Jencks Act. See supra note
261 and accompanying text.
264. Two states already have declined to follow the Opinion in other respects.
Specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s analogue to Rule 3.8(d), DR
7-103, is not broader than prosecutors’ legal obligations and does not require
disclosure of impeachment information prior to a guilty plea (contrary to the
conclusions contained in the Opinion. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923
N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) (per curiam). Kellog-Martin was decided after Formal
Opinion 09-454 was issued, but the court made no mention of the Opinion.
Furthermore, when the California Bar Board of Governors proposed updates to its
professional conduct rules, it decided against including the language of Model Rule
3.8(d), opting instead to make prosecutors’ obligations co-extensive with “all
constitutional obligations, as interpreted by relevant case law.” Joan C. Rogers, In Its
Final Look at Full Set of Updates, California Bar Endorses Last Seven Rules, 26 LAW.
MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT 619, 620–21 (2010). Compare COMM’N FOR THE REVISION OF
THE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, STATE BAR OF CAL., DISCUSSION DRAFT: PROPOSED
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These two solutions would be the most readily attainable fixes. The
first would quickly and clearly solve the problem, but it seems
unlikely that the ABA Ethics Committee will undertake to revise its
Opinion. The second solution is more likely, but is unsatisfactory on
several levels, especially because relying on state ethics bodies one-byone to reject extensions of their state’s version of Rule 3.8(d) to
situations in which federal prosecutors acted in accordance with the
Jencks Act would leave prosecutors in a state of uncertainty in the
meantime.265 Moreover, it remains to be seen how willing the states
will be to discipline federal prosecutors who have complied with the
constitutional (i.e., Brady and its progeny), statutory (i.e., the Jencks
Act), and rule-based (i.e., Rules 16 and 26.2 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure) requirements governing their conduct. To the
extent that states choose to confront the issue directly, Opinion may,
ironically, have the effect opposite that which its drafters intended.
More states may begin to explicitly align their ethics rules with the
standards dictated by constitutional doctrine, which Ohio and
California have already done in the aftermath of the Opinion,266 and
thus close off any possible expansion of a prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations, in direct contrast to the intent of the Opinion.
More likely though, state ethics bodies will avoid this problem
altogether by declining to pursue cases involving disclosure issues and
federal prosecutors, a practice that some believe is already too
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA 78–79, 92 (2010), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=WBiabhKgb9s%3d&tabid=2653 (version circulated for public comment),
with BD. OF GOVERNORS, STATE BAR OF CAL., PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 72 (2010), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/9/documents/
CRRPC/Proposed%20Rules%20of%20Professional%20Conduct.pdf
(version adopted by the Board of Governors on July 24, 2010). The decision was
reportedly motivated by California prosecutors’ concerns about the language and
reasoning of the Opinion. See Rogers, supra, at 620–21.
265. See Hellman, supra note 172, at 332 (“[G]iven that the states are free to
depart from ABA interpretations, and frequently do so, the publication of each new
ABA opinion presents lawyers everywhere with an unavoidable question: Will this
opinion be followed by enforcement authorities in my jurisdiction?”). This is one of
the primary criticisms of the ethics opinion process in the first place. See supra notes
219–221 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 264 (citing Ohio and California as two states that have decided
to align their state codified analogue of Rule 3.8(d) with constitutional standards in
the wake of Formal Opinion 09-454). Prior to the Opinion, a couple of other
jurisdictions had already explicitly aligned their ethics rules on prosecutorial
disclosure with federal constitutional standards. See D.C. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.8 cmt. 1 (2012) (clarifying that the rule “is not intended either to restrict or to
expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the United States Constitution,
federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of procedure”); N.C. RULES
PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d) (2012) (requiring timely disclosure of “all evidence or
information required to be disclosed by applicable law, rules of procedure, or court
opinions”).
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prevalent.267 While this may be the “right” outcome substantively in
that it is the functional equivalent of a declaration that a prosecutor
will not be disciplined for conforming her behavior to the federal law
in her jurisdiction, it undermines the legitimacy and fairness of the
ethics rules. Ultimately, the vacuum left by the uncertainty and likely
inaction by the state bar authorities just invites the sort of tactical
gamesmanship in litigation outlined in Part III.C(4) above.268
This leads to the larger, longer-term question of how to harmonize
the disparate disclosure rules governing federal prosecutors on the
question of timing. If proponents of earlier disclosure are serious
about policy change, the way forward runs through at least one, or
some combination of, the three institutions legitimately capable of
resolving the conflict posed by the juxtaposition of the Brady doctrine
and the Jencks Act: the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court. The picture that emerges from
the events described in this Article—which suggests that proponents
of a certain viewpoint tried to work within these channels, were
unsuccessful, and then essentially attempted to bypass them—should
be troubling in any scenario. But because of the confluence of
factors at play here —a federal statute in tension with a constitutional
doctrine and, on top of that, a circuit split —the Opinion is not an
acceptable or adequate solution.
The institution best suited to deal with this issue is the Judicial
Conference, through its Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules and
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.269 The
Judicial Conference is, after all, responsible for promulgating federal
267. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 685, 722–23 (2006) (pointing out the significant absence of discipline on
prosecutors who suppressed evidence favorable to defendants); Green, supra note
149, at 2180 (noting that “state disciplinary authorities rarely sanction prosecutors
publicly for wrongdoing in general or for wrongdoing in connection with their
disclosure obligations in particular”); Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement
of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 848–50 (2010) (summarizing
criticisms and empirical evidence regarding perceived lack of enforcement of
disclosure rules); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (surveying the fifty states
and the District of Columbia and discovering that disciplinary charges against
prosecutors are only infrequently brought and meaningful sanctions rarely ever
applied).
268. See supra notes 244–261 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
defense attorneys used Rule 3.8(d) and Formal Opinion 09-454 as tactical weapons in
an attempt to obtain information favorable to the defense earlier than constitutional
and statutory standards require).
269. See supra Part II.C. See generally Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice
and Procedure, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/
FederalRulemaking/RuleMakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (describing the
process for amending rules of practice and procedure through the Judicial
Conference).
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criminal discovery rules.270 And, while prosecutorial disclosure has a
constitutional dimension and has been shoehorned into the ethics
rules, the specific question at the heart of this Article—whether
favorable information in a witness statement must be turned over to
the defense immediately, at some later time but prior to trial, or at
trial —seems most genuinely categorized as one of discovery. It is all
about who gets to see what and when, what is fair, and what is
practical. These are the sort of issues the Advisory Committee
grapples with all the time as it considers changes to the criminal
discovery rules.
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee is
compositionally well-suited for this task: its members include federal
judges and representatives from both the prosecution (DOJ) and the
criminal defense community.271
As set forth in Part II.C above, after careful consideration of the
issue, the Advisory Committee ultimately was not convinced that
there was any pressing need to change Rule 16 to require earlier
disclosure, concluding that it would be very difficult to amend the
current rule in such a manner without running afoul of the Jencks
Act.272 That is not to say, however, that the Judicial Conference
cannot so amend the rules. Indeed, as the Advisory Committee has
repeatedly acknowledged, in connection with past consideration of
amendments to Rule 16, the Judicial Conference can propose to
amend the criminal procedure rules in a way that conflicts with a
federal statute.273 The procedural rule—if approved by the Supreme
Court and Congress274— would take precedence over the conflicting
270. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006) (providing authority, as well as rules and
procedures, for rulemaking process).
271. See generally Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure: Chairs and Reporters,
U.S COURTS (June 12, 2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Members_List_Oct_2011.pdf (providing a list of the Judicial Conference’s
Standing Committee and Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules’ members, which
includes both prosecutors and defense attorneys); sources cited supra 122–144
(demonstrating the diverse membership of the Judicial Conference through the
various reports, letters, memos, and meeting minutes cited).
272. See supra notes 122–144 and accompanying text (explaining the Advisory
Committee’s decision and reasoning not to amend Rule 16 in a way that would
conflict with the Jencks Act).
273. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. MAY 2011 REPORT, supra note 141, at 11–12 (noting
conflict between proposed amendment to Rule 16 and the Jencks Act, and
explaining the practical and policy reasons for wanting to avoid making rule changes
that create conflict with existing law even though within Judicial Conference’s
authority to do so); Advisory Comm. Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 130, at 9
(summarizing Judge Tallman’s explanation to the Committee that in the event of a
conflict between an amended rule and a statute, the supersession clause of the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, could resolve the conflict in favor of the rule, but
noting that resort to the supersession clause should be considered a last resort and
that conflicts should be avoided when possible).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (providing that the Judicial Conference’s amended rules
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statute pursuant to the supersession clause of the Rules Enabling
Act.275 Thus, proponents of earlier disclosure do have a legitimate,
albeit indirect, way around the impediment posed federally by the
Jencks Act: they can either work with the Advisory Committee on
crafting a proposal that does not directly conflict with the Jencks Act,
or they can try to convince the Advisory Committee (and after that,
the Standing Committee) that it is worth invoking the supersession
clause to resolve the issue.
Alternatively, Congress can amend or repeal the Jencks Act, which
would resolve the issue once and for all. While Congress may not be
as adept as the Judicial Conference at fine-tuning the rules that
govern the day-to-day workings of our federal courts, it undoubtedly
has the authority to act in this arena. And institutionally, Congress is
capable of balancing the concerns of defendants’ rights against
witness safety and the integrity of the proceedings, which were the
competing factors that motivated the passage of the Jencks Act in the
first place. But much has changed in federal criminal practice since
the Jencks Act was first passed in 1957 and, given that modern
prosecutors generally do provide witness statements to the defense in
advance,276 sometimes far in advance, of a witness’s testimony,
perhaps the Jencks Act has outlived its usefulness.
That
determination should be made by Congress, however, and not by the
ABA Ethics Committee.277
do not have the effect of law unless approved by the Supreme Court and Congress).
275. See id. § 2072(b) (providing that when existing laws conflict with new rules of
procedure, the laws shall be of “no further force or effect”).
276. See Podgor, supra note 45, at 655 (reporting on survey results showing
prosecutors providing, for the most part, Jencks Act witness statements to the defense
in advance of the witness testifying).
277. A discovery reform bill, proposed by NACDL and supported by the ABA, was
recently introduced in the Senate by Senator Lisa Murkowski (who, as did the late
Senator Ted Stevens, represents Alaska). Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of
2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012); see Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers, NACDL Applauds Sensible, Bipartisan Discovery Reform Legislation
Introduced Today in the United States Senate (Mar. 15, 2012),
http:///www.nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=23792&libID=23761
(announcing
introduction of the bill). Although the bill is not specifically aimed primarily at
amending or repealing the Jencks Act, it would substantially modify it by requiring
early disclosure of all favorable information, “notwithstanding the Jencks Act.” S.
2197 § 2. The bill is, on the question of timing, remarkably similar in substance and
wording to Formal Opinion 09-454, except that, unlike the Opinion, the bill
addresses head on the conflict with the Jencks Act. Compare id. (proposing to require
the government to disclose favorable information to the defendant in a federal
criminal prosecution “without delay after arraignment and before the entry of any
guilty plea,” or, if the information is discovered later, “as soon as is reasonably
practicable upon the existence of the . . . information becoming known . . . [,]
notwithstanding [the Jencks Act] or any other provision of law”), with ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6 (2009) (interpreting Model
Rule 3.8(d) to require disclosure of favorable evidence and information “as soon as
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Finally, at the heart of this conflict is a circuit split over which takes
precedence when it comes to the timing of disclosure of favorable
evidence in witness statements: the Jencks Act or Brady.278 In those
jurisdictions where courts have held that Brady controls the timing of
disclosure of all favorable evidence, even if contained in a witness
statement and notwithstanding the Jencks Act, district courts already
can order early disclosure of the evidence, and the new interpretation
of the ethics rule does not directly conflict with the prevailing law.
On the other hand, in jurisdictions where courts have acknowledged
the primacy of the Jencks Act, district courts cannot order disclosure
of evidence any sooner than what the Jencks Act provides;279 The
Opinion’s interpretation of the ethics rule does directly conflict with
the prevailing law in these jurisdictions. Although it is clearly within
the province of the Supreme Court to resolve circuit splits, it has
never ruled on this question that has divided the courts for decades:
whether the Jencks Act or Brady takes precedence when the two are
in conflict.
Perhaps it is time for the Court to do so. If the Court were to rule
that Brady takes precedence over the Jencks Act, it would resolve the
circuit split and remove the legal impediment to interpreting Rule
3.8(d) in the manner advocated by the Opinion (not to mention
making it much easier for defendants to get earlier disclosure in the
first place without resorting to the tactical ruse of invoking the ethics
rule and this new interpretation of it in litigation). Of course, the
Supreme Court could rule the opposite, which would mean that
defendants in every jurisdiction would be stuck with a rule allowing
prosecutors to decline to disclose favorable information in Jencks Act
witness statements until after the witness has testified at trial. That is
a risk the proponents of earlier disclosure run, but the fact remains
that trying to convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a
Jencks/Brady conflict case remains a viable and legitimate option for
attempting to change the law in their favor.
Many prosecutors will no doubt take issue with the assertion that
the Opinion’s interpretation of the timing requirement would no
longer run counter to the law if the Jencks Act were neutralized by
reasonably practical” “once known to the prosecutor”). The Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on the bill on June 6, 2012, see Ensuring That Federal
Prosecutors Meet Discovery Obligations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2012), but it remains to be seen whether any further action will be taken.
278. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (contrasting the Second, Third,
and D.C. Circuits’ holding that Jencks does not override Brady requirements with the
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ holding that the Jencks Act trumps Brady when the
two are in conflict).
279. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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one of the means described above. They may correctly point out that
even Brady does not require disclosure “as soon as reasonably
practical,” 280 but instead requires disclosure only in time for the
defense to make effective use of the information at trial.281 While that
may be true, there is a difference between having an ethics rule that
goes beyond the minimum required by law, which the Supreme
Court has suggested is permissible,282 and having an ethics rule that is
in direct conflict with the law.
It is because of this conflict that amending the underlying ethics
rule itself is not included as a viable solution, although that would be
preferable in some respects to changing the rule indirectly by fiat via
an ethics opinion, as the ABA Ethics Committee did in this case.283
When an ethics rule is basically consistent with what the law requires
but holds prosecutors to a higher standard, there is still a question as
to whether issues like the details of the timing and scope of
prosecutorial disclosure ought to be regulated by the ethics rule at
all. The better answer appears to be “no,” 284 although there is room
for debate. But it seems much clearer that the ethics rules for
prosecutors ought not venture into territory where they directly
conflict with federal law. Whether such rules are enforceable if they
do conflict is a question best left for another day.
Conclusion
The scope and timing of the disclosure of evidence favorable to the
defense in federal criminal trials has long been debated. This is due
to the tension between the many sources of law that govern the issue:
a constitutional doctrine that in its practical application is more
backward-looking than forward-looking; a federal statute whose status
vis-à-vis the constitutional doctrine has never been definitively
explicated; and state ethics rules whose wording and enforcement
can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With the issuance of
Formal Opinion 09-454, the ABA Ethics Committee has now made a
280. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6.
281. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
282. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 479 n.15 (2009) (noting that while Brady only
mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or
statutory obligations).
283. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (contrasting the relative openness
and transparency of major rules revisions to the secretive nature of the ethics
opinion process).
284. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 103, at 1460–65 (making the case that the lack of
enforcement of ethics rules coupled with courts’ ability to better enforce discovery
through the rules of criminal procedure makes Rule 3.8(d) an ineffectual and
inappropriate vehicle to establish disclosure timetables).
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bad situation worse. By interpreting the model ethics rule so broadly,
it has placed the rule in direct conflict with federal law, at least as it is
interpreted in many jurisdictions. The time has come to harmonize
all of the rules governing disclosure in federal criminal practice, but
the solution should lie in confronting the root of the problem, the
Jencks/Brady conflict, directly.
This Article has outlined at least three ways this can be
accomplished: by amending Rule 16 and invoking the supersession
clause, by amending or repealing the Jencks Act, or by holding that
due process sometimes requires that the Jencks Act not be enforced.
Unfortunately for proponents of broader and earlier disclosure, every
one of these solutions would require working with institutions—the
Judicial Conference committees, Congress, and the Supreme
Court —that have not been particularly receptive to their point of
view. As a matter of fairness, legitimacy, and enforceability, however,
any one of these solutions is preferable to threatening to discipline
prosecutors for acting in accordance with the law.

